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CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

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TO: April 1959

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CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

Chapter I

CAVALRY OPERATIONS DURING THE UNION APPROACH MARCH

December 26, 1862, the day selected by Major General William S. Rosecrans to inaugurate his projected advance from Nashville into the heart of Middle Tennessee, found the Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, concentrated in the Murfreesboro area. Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk's corps consisting of the infantry divisions, commanded by Major Generals B. Franklin Cheatham and Jones M. Withers, and three brigades of Major General John C. Breckinridge's division, which were assigned to the corps, led by Lieutenant General William H. Hardee, constituted Bragg's center, and were camped in and around Murfreesboro. Brigadier General John K. Jackson's brigade which had until recently been guarding the railroad between Murfreesboro and Bridgeport, Alabama, had also been concentrated at the former town. Upon its arrival at Murfreesboro, Jackson's brigade was assigned to Breckinridge's division by Bragg.

The other division of Hardee's corps; commanded by Major General Patrick R. Cleburne, reinforced by Brigadier General Daniel W. Adams' brigade, of Breckinridge's division, was based at College Grove, near Eagleville, some 15 miles west of Murfreesboro. This force, with which Hardee maintained his headquarters, guarded the Confederate left. The right flank of Bragg's army rested at Readyville, 12 miles east of Murfreesboro. Readyville was garrisoned by the division, led by Major

General John P. McCown. This division was an organic part of the corps, commanded by Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith. But prior to the Stones River Campaign, McCown had been directed by the Confederate War Department to report to Hardee for orders. The reason being that at this time Kirby Smith was in Knoxville, exercising command of the Department of East Tennessee.¹

Bragg's once all powerful force of cavalry had been considerably reduced at the time that Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland commenced its forward movement. The redoubtable Brigadier General Nathan B. Forrest with some 1900 of his hard-riding troopers had crossed the Tennessee River into West Tennessee. At this very moment Forrest's men were wreaking havoc on the Union Supply lines, which were used to funnel supplies to Major General Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Tennessee, then operating in North Mississippi. On December 22, four days before the Army of the Cumberland had marched out of Nashville, Bragg's other thunderbolt-Brigadier General John H. Morgan had ridden out of Alexandria, Tennessee, enroute to Kentucky. With him on his second Kentucky raid Morgan took a force consisting of 3100 rank and file, supported by seven pieces of artillery. The vital Louisville and Nashville Railroad, over which Rosecrans drew his supplies was the primary objective of Morgan and his "terrible men". The departure of these two crack commands, under their able leaders, served to reduce by one-half the strength of the cavalry serving with the Army of Tennessee. Thus when the period of active campaigning commenced, the Federals in Tennessee, for the first

time in the war, had almost as many cavalymen present with their field army as the butternuts.²

Following the departure of Forrest and Morgan there remained with the Army of Tennessee four cavalry brigades. Three of these, commanded respectively by Brigadier Generals Joseph Wheeler, John A. Wharton, and John Pegram were charged with the responsibility of picketing the army's front and flanks. An understrength brigade of cavalry, led by Brigadier General Abraham Buford, mustering some 600 sabers was stationed at McMinnville.³ General Wheeler had been placed in command of the Army's cavalry by Bragg.

December 26th found Wheeler's brigade bivouacked on Stewarts Creek, along side the Nashville pike, some ten miles northwest of Murfreesboro. Wheeler had covered his front, extending from a point east of Stones River on his right, to a point approximately midway between the Nashville pike and Brentwood on his left, with a strong line of vedettes. On the Nashville pike, Wheeler had established an outpost within ten miles of Nashville.⁴ General Pegram's under strength brigade, was posted on Wheeler's right, covering the approaches to Murfreesboro from Lebanon. At a point 12 miles north of Murfreesboro, where the Lebanon pike crossed Fall Creek, Pegram established his headquarters. Strong patrols were thrown out daily as far as Baird's Mill, six miles north of the Fall Creek staging area.⁵ General Wharton's combat-wise brigade took position on Wheeler's left. Wharton selected Nolensville as his base of operation. The Texan's brigade was charged with the

responsibility of screening the Confederates' left flank. Wharton's picket line tied in with Wheeler's on the right, and extended in a southwesterly direction as far as Franklin.⁶

Three infantry brigades were advanced and posted in close supporting distance of each of the cavalry brigades. The hard-hitting brigade, commanded by Brigadier General George Maney, of Cheatham's division, was thrown forward to Stewarts Creek to bolster Wheeler's command.⁷ A brigade from Cleburne's division, led by the Brigadier General Stirling A. M. Wood, was stationed at Triune, ready to move to Wharton's succor if the need should arise.⁸ Pegram's troops were supported by Colonel John Q. Loomis, Alabama brigade, which was drawn from Withers' division.

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the intelligence that Bragg's Army of Tennessee had been weakened by the departure of Forrest's and Morgan's raiders, to pray on the Union supply lines, Rosecrans learned, from his staff, that sufficient war material had been stock piled in the Nashville magazines to enable the Army of the Cumberland to assume the offensive. As matured Rosecrans' master plan called for the following movements: Major General Alexander M. McCook's Right Wing, consisting of three divisions, would move out of the Nashville defenses, via the Nolensville pike, to Triune. Major General George H. Thomas, with two divisions, would advance on McCook's right. Thomas' command would utilize the Franklin and Wilson pikes as it pushed forward. While McCook threatened Hardee's command in front, Thomas' would threaten his left flank. Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, in command of the

three divisions which constituted the Army of the Cumberland's Left Wing, would move forward on McCook's left as far as Lavergne, using the Nashville pike as the axis of his advance. Once Thomas' two divisions reached Nolensville, McCook was to attack Hardee at Triune. If Bragg should decide to stand and fight and reinforced Hardee with Polk, Thomas was to rush to McCook's support. However, if McCook should defeat Hardee unaided or force him to evacuate Triune without a fight, and the Rebels should mass behind Stewarts Creek, Crittenden was to spearhead the attack. If these circumstances came to pass, Thomas was to move into position on Crittenden's right, while McCook, after detaching a division charged with the mission of pursuing Hardee, would endeavor to turn the Confederates' left and get into their rear. After drafting these orders for the guidance of his subordinates, Rosecrans scheduled D-day for the morning of the 26th.⁹

Prior to the Army of the Cumberland's departure from Nashville, Major General David S. Stanley, Rosecrans' hand-picked chief of cavalry, divided the 4200 troopers assigned to his organization into three commands. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Robert H. G. Minty, would operate along the Nashville pike, screening the advance of Crittenden's corps. Colonel Lewis Zahm's 2d Brigade would drive directly on Franklin, covering the right flank of McCook's column, and brushing aside Wharton's Rebel troopers. A reserve force consisting of three recently organized regiments, stiffened by four companies of the 3d Indiana Cavalry, would receive their orders directly from General Stanley. With this force

Stanley would cover McCook's corps as it pushed toward Nolensville. Colonel Minty would receive his orders directly from Colonel John Kennett, who commanded the division of cavalry.¹⁰

At 6 a.m. on the 26th, several hours before Stanley's troopers put in an appearance at McCook's camps which were situated on Mill Creek, five miles south of Nashville, the infantry had hit the road. The division, commanded by Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis, tramped southward along the Edmondson pike. Davis' division would utilize the Edmondson pike as its avenue of advance as far as Prim's blacksmith shop. Here the division would turn into a country lane, which led to Nolensville. Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan's division trudged out of the Mill Creek staging area at the same hour as Davis' did. Sheridan used as the axis of his advance, the Nolensville pike. McCook's third division, led by Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson, followed in Sheridan's wake. By the time that Stanley's command put in its appearance, the roads leading to Nolensville were jammed with McCook's troops and their trains. It was apparent to the troopers that they would not be able to reach their assigned positions in advance of McCook's Right Wing, until after the infantry had bivouacked for the night.¹¹

The advance guard of both Davis' and Sheridan's columns quickly established contact with Wharton's outposts - charged with the responsibility of observing the Edmondson and Nolensville pikes. The only cavalry unit with Davis' division at this time was the general's escort - Company K, 15th Illinois Cavalry. However, as Wharton's vedettes fell back without making a stand, the Illinois cavalymen were able to push

to within one mile of Nolensville before they were forced to call for help.

In spite of the heavy rain which pelted the column, Davis' infantry and artillery reached Prim's blacksmith in good stead. Here the division left the Edmondson pike and turned into the country lane, which it would follow to Nolensville. The steep hills and the road rendered all but impassable by the downpour served to retard the column's progress. Coming up with his advance guard Davis was informed by the Illinoisans and residents of the area that a strong force of Confederates (Wharton's brigade), supported by artillery, was in occupation of Nolensville. Before deploying his division Davis sent a staff officer to inform Sheridan, whose division was advancing along the Nolensville pike, and had not yet put in an appearance, that the enemy had been located. Believing that he was strong enough to deal with the situation unaided, Davis formed his division for the attack. The brigade, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post, was deployed to the left of the road. Captain Oscar F. Pinney's 5th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery was emplaced, to command the town and its southwestern approaches. While Post was deploying his men into line of battle, Wharton's troopers could be seen massing on the hills southwest of Nolensville. Davis fearing that the Rebels planned to turn his right flank, issued orders for Colonel William P. Carlin to form his brigade on Post's right. Colonel William E. Woodruff's 3d Brigade then moved into position on Carlin's right. While the Federals were forming for the attack the Confederate succeeded in emplacing White's Tennessee Battery. However, before the Tennesseans

were able to get off more than a few rounds, Pinney's six gun battery had roared into action.¹²

Wharton having accomplished his mission, by forcing the Yankees to deploy, gave the order to withdraw. Except for some rather brisk skirmishing between the Rebels' rearguard and Carlin's brigade, which occupied the town, Wharton's troopers succeeded in breaking contact with the foe. Having captured Nolensville, and while waiting for the remainder of McCook's corps to put in an appearance, Davis learned from his scouts that Wharton's men had fallen back only some two miles.

After evacuating the village, Wharton's rugged troopers had taken position ready to defend Knob Gap, through which the Nolensville and Triune pike passed. In spite of the late hour and the fatigued condition of his men, due to the hard day's march through rain and mud, Davis decided to attack before the Southerners could dig in. Once the brigade commanders had mustered their units, the advance was resumed - Post's brigade in the lead. As Post's vanguard approached Knob Gap it was fired upon by White's Tennessee Battery. In response to Post's call for artillery support, the cannoneers of the 5th Wisconsin and 2d Battery, Minnesota Light Artillery came thundering forward. The artillerists from the "Old Northwest" quickly unlimbered their pieces, and commenced to hammer the Rebels with shot and shell. While the artillery was softening up Wharton's position, Davis formed his brigade for assault - Post to the left of the road, Carlin to the right, with Woodruff on the latter officer's right. At an order from Davis the powerful Union line of battle

surged forward. Wharton's troopers were driven from the gap so rapidly that White's cannoneers were unable to remove one of their guns, which along with its caisson, was captured by Carlin's brigade. Davis taking cognizance of the late hour, in accordance with the instructions he had received from McCook, permitted his men to bivouac for the night. Wharton's troopers, following their eviction from the gap, fell back toward Triune, where the supporting infantry of Wood's brigade was camped.¹³

McCook's main column, spearheaded by Sheridan's division, moving along the Nolensville pike had encountered Wharton's vedettes, several miles south of the Mill Creek staging area. These were quickly routed. The bluecoats capturing a lieutenant and a private. In response to Davis' message, the combative Sheridan had quickened the pace of his march. But by the time the head of Sheridan's division reached Nolensville, Davis was engaged in driving the butternuts from Knob Gap. McCook then directed Sheridan and Johnson to have their troops camp for the night at Nolensville.¹⁴

Thomas' corps with Brigadier General James S. Negley's division in the van, followed by Major General Lovell H. Rousseau's division, and Colonel Moses B. Walker's brigade, marched out of the Nashville perimeter via the Franklin pike. If all went according to plan the troops of Thomas' corps would camp for the night at Owen's Store, on the Wilson pike. Reaching Brentwood, Thomas' troops left the Franklin pike, turning into the Wilson pike. As the head of Negley's column reached

Owen's store, late on the afternoon of the 26th, the sound of heavy firing from the direction of Nolensville, where Davis had engaged Wharton, became distinctly audible. Negley determined to march to the sound of the guns. Leaving his trains to follow, Negley pushed rapidly forward to Davis' support. However, Negley was too late. For by the time that his hard-marching column reached Nolensville, the Rebels had been hurled from Knob Gap. Negley's division, considerably fatigued by its forced march, then camped for the night. The muddy condition of the roads made it impossible for the remainder of Thomas' corps to keep pace with Negley; Rousseau halted for the night at Owen's store; Walker with his brigade bivouacked at Brentwood.¹⁵

Colonel Zahm's cavalry brigade, 950 strong, broke camp at 8 a.m. Riding southward along the Franklin pike, Zahm's troopers found the road choked with Thomas' troops and their immense trains. After passing through Brentwood, where Thomas' command had turned into the Wilson pike, the mounted column picked up speed as it moved toward Franklin. Two and one-half miles north of Franklin, Zahm's point - the 3d Ohio Cavalry - encountered and drove in a Confederate outpost.

Franklin at this time was garrisoned by two of Wharton's units - the 4th Tennessee Cavalry and Davis' Tennessee Cavalry Battalion. Deploying his brigade to the left and right of the road Zahm pressed forward. Falling back across the Big Harpeth River, the Tennesseans took position covering the river. After making a hurried estimate of the situation, Zahm dismounted six of his companies, with instructions to

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act as skirmishers. The remainder of the brigade took position on the skirmishers' flank. Zahm then gave the signal to attack! Surging forward the bluecoats forced their way across the Big Harpeth River. After a sharp clash, the butternuts beat a hasty retreat, leaving ten prisoners in the Yankees' hands. Due to the late hour, the Federals curtailed their pursuit, after following the Confederates for about two miles. Upon interrogating the prisoners, Zahm learned that there was a strong Confederate force (Wood's brigade) stationed near Triune. Having successfully discharged his mission Zahm retraced his steps. Reaching Owen's store about 9 a.m. Zahm's troopers halted for the night.¹⁶

Crittenden's corps, Brigadier General John M. Palmer's division, in the lead, utilized the Nashville pike as the axis of its advance as it drove toward Murfreesboro. Shortly after taking up the march on the 26th, Palmer was joined by Colonels Kennett and Minty. In accordance with the instructions received from Palmer through Kennett, Minty deployed his brigade to screen Crittenden's advance. The 3d Kentucky was placed on the left of the pike, the 7th Pennsylvania on the right, and the 4th Michigan on the pike in reserve. A strong advance guard was pushed to the front. Near the 11 mile stone, Minty's troopers encountered one of Wheeler's outposts. A brisk skirmish ensued. In this clash the Unionists drove the Rebels from the cedar break, where they had holed up, capturing six of them. After this flurry of excitement the advance was resumed.¹⁷

Wheeler, upon receipt of the intelligence that the bluecoats had

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driven in his vedettes left his Lavergne headquarters, and rode to the front. Here a hasty personal reconnaissance served to convince Wheeler that the Federals were advancing in force. In hopes of delaying the powerful Union column, Wheeler sent a member of his staff galloping madly to the rear to order up his entire command. Once the news of the Federal advance had been communicated to the unit commanders, they mustered their men. Swinging into their saddles the hard-bitten troopers of Wheeler's brigade left their Stewarts Creek cantonment. When the cavalrymen reached Lavergne they found their general eagerly awaiting them. Wheeler then led his brigade to a point astride the pike, two miles northwest of Lavergne, where he deployed them in line of battle, covering the crossings of Hurricane Creek. The troopers were told to dismount and take it easy pending the Yankees' appearance. The four guns of Wiggins' Arkansas Battery were emplaced near the pike.¹⁸

General Maney, the officer in command of Wheeler's supporting infantry force, also moved his brigade from Stewarts Creek to Lavergne. Upon reaching Lavergne, Maney conferred briefly with Wheeler. Convinced by what he was able to learn from the cavalry officer, concerning the strength of Union Column, Maney decided to advise Bragg that the foe was advancing in force.¹⁹

After having routed the Rebel outpost from the cedar break, Minty's troopers resumed the advance. Pushing forward the bluecoated cavalrymen were slightly distressed to note that the butternuts, who were observing their advance, seemed to be constantly increasing in

numbers. The cavalry's march was finally brought to a sudden stop when the troopers sighted Wheeler's line of battle massed to contest the passage of Hurricane Creek. Minty taking cognizance of Wiggins' four guns, ordered Lieutenant Nathaniel M. Newell, of Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, to employ his two 3-inch Rodmans on the pike. Simultaneously a staff officer was sent racing to the rear to urge that Palmer hurry to the cavalry's help.

An artillery duel of about one-half hour's duration now ensued between Wiggins' and Newell's gunners, before the vanguard of Palmer's division arrived. Once the energetic Palmer had put in an appearance he directed Captain William E. Standard, to put the six guns of Battery B, 1st Ohio Light Artillery into action alongside Newell's. Brigadier General Charles Cruft was instructed to deploy his brigade to the left of the road, force a crossing of Hurricane Creek, and, if it was still daylight, to occupy Lavergne. Colonel Walter C. Whitaker, who was in temporary command of Colonel William B. Hazen's brigade, would form his unit to the right of the road. A hasty reconnaissance of the Confederates' right convinced Cruft that it could be easily turned. A combat team composed of the 31st Indiana and 1st Kentucky, led by Colonel David A. Emyart, was detailed to carry out the flanking operations. The 3d Kentucky Cavalry would screen Emyart's combat team's left flank as it moved forward. In conjunction with Emyart's attack Colonel Whitaker, accompanied by the 9th Indiana and 6th Kentucky, would attack and turn Wheeler's left.²⁰

Confronted by a powerful force to his immediate front and with both his flanks threatened by Enyart's and Whitaker's combat teams, Wheeler ordered his men to be ready to retire on an instant's notice. Enyart's men, upon debouching from the cedars, sighted one of Wheeler's combat patrols near the small frame church situated near the west bank of Hurricane Creek. Enyart roared out the order for his men to charge! With bayonets flashing the blueclads drove the Confederates across the creek. Following in the Rebels' wake, Enyart's men easily reached the stream's east bank. As it was getting quite dark, Enyart decided not to push into Lavergne. Instead he deployed his troops in a field near the village's northern outskirts. South of the Nashville pike, Whitaker's combat team, after an animated contest, forced its way across Hurricane Creek. However, Whitaker found himself confronted by the same problem as Enyart, for the advent of darkness forced him to suspend his attack.

Thus when the fighting ceased for the night the Confederates still held Lavergne, but the Yankees had succeeded in establishing bridgeheads on the stream's right bank. Crittenden's corps, except for the troop holding the bridgeheads, spent the night of the 26th camped on the left bank of Hurricane creek. Wheeler's cavalry and Maney's infantry (which had not been engaged) bivouacked in line of battle covering Lavergne. In the fighting in front of Lavergne, Crittenden listed his casualties as follows: 2 killed and 16 wounded. Wheeler made no report of his losses, but Crittenden reported that his men had captured 12 butternuts. In a letter to Rosecrans dated the 26th, Crittenden reported:

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"In all these skirmishes the enemy fought with such determination as to induce the belief that there must have been a large force in the neighborhood."²¹

On the evening of the 26th Wheeler proceeded to Murfreesboro, where he attended a meeting which had been called by General Bragg. The commander of the Army of Tennessee having decided to concentrate his forces in front of Murfreesboro reportedly asked Wheeler, "How long can you hold them on the road?" "About four days, general", Wheeler quickly replied. Bragg then issued the orders for the concentration of his army, and the conference adjourned.²²

General Cleburne, in accordance with the instruction received from Hardee on the previous evening, turned his command out at an early hour on the 27th. Realizing that McCook's Union column would probably drive down the Nolensville pike toward Triune, the combative Cleburne planned to meet the foe on ground of his choosing, a mile north of College Grove. While Cleburne was engaged in deploying three of his own brigades and Adams', of Breckinridge's division, orders were received from Hardee to move to Murfreesboro. This was to implement Bragg's decision, to concentrate the Army of Tennessee at that point. Wood's brigade would be left at Triune, to assist Wharton's cavalry in retarding the bluecoats' advance. Drenched by a cold rain, Cleburne's troops moved over a miserable road to Versailles. Here the column turned into the Salem pike. Nightfall found Cleburne's tired and disgusted veterans encamped on the Salem pike, one mile west of Stones River.²³

Late on the evening of the 26th, Bragg's order calling for a con-

centration at Murfreesboro reached McCown's headquarters at Readyville. The general ordered reveille sounded and the men mustered. Long before daybreak, McCown had his troops on the road. In spite of the disagreeable weather, McCown's division negotiated the 12 miles, which separated Readyville from Murfreesboro by 9 a.m. on the 27th. Upon reaching Murfreesbor, McCown's troops were posted east of Stones River, adjacent to the Nashville pike.²⁴

After having ordered Cleburne to move his command to Murfreesboro, Hardee proceeded to Triune to confer with Generals Wharton and Wood. Hardee informed the two officers of Bragg's plan for a concentration at Murfreesboro, and briefed them as to their respective roles. The two generals were expected to delay the foe's advance, to the best of their ability. Hardee, accompanied by his staff, then returned to Murfreesboro. Following Hardee's departure, Wood and Wharton deployed their commands in hopes that they would be able to give McCook's advancing column a hot reception. The 45th Mississippi Infantry was posted about one and one-half miles north of Triune, on the Nolensville pike; four companies deployed as skirmishers on the right of the road; three supporting a section of the Jefferson Flying Artillery, which was masked and emplaced to the left of the road; and one company thrown out to guard the left flank. Wood held the remainder of his small brigade in reserve, immediately south of the village. Wharton's cavalry took position astride the pike a half mile in advance of the 45th Mississippi. Having deployed their men Wood and Wharton confidently awaited the Federal advance.²⁵

On the night of the 26th General Rosecrans had visited McCook's headquarters at Nolensville. While there Rosecrans told his subordinate that on the morrow he was to move on Triune, and attack Hardee's corps, which intelligence reports reaching army headquarters, had indicated was quartered there.²⁶

In accordance with McCook's orders his subordinates turned their men out, before daybreak on the 27th. After a hurried breakfast the troops moved out - General Stanley's cavalry command in the lead, following closely by Johnson's division. It had stopped raining now, but the country was blanketed by a dense fog, which limited visibility to about 150 yards. General Stanley remarking that he "had understood the 3d [Indiana] knew how to take these rebels", ordered the Hoosiers to take the lead. A mile south of Bole Jack Pass, as the Indianians groped their way forward, they sighted a strong force of Wharton's command drawn up in line of battle. Major Robert Klein barked out the order to charge! Digging their spurs into their horses' flanks the Hoosiers surged forward. After a spirited contest the butternuts gave way, retreating across a narrow valley. The gunners of the Jefferson Flying Artillery now opened fire on the Indianians, bringing their advance to an abrupt halt.²⁷

Harking to the roar of the artillery Stanley, accompanied by the rest of his command, joined the Indianians. A quick reconnaissance convinced the general that he would need both infantry and artillery to

break the Rebel roadblock. This request was immediately relayed to General Johnson. Accordingly Johnson ordered his advance brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Edward N. Kirk, to move to the cavalry's support. Kirk deployed the 34th Illinois and 29th Indiana as skirmishers to the left of the road; the remainder of the brigade would move forward in line of battle covered by the skirmishers - the 30th Indiana in support of Battery E, 1st Ohio Light Artillery. Stanley's cavalry would cover the infantry's flanks.

However, before his men were able to close with the Rebels, McCook fearful that the dense fog which enveloped everything, would render it impossible for his men to distinguish friend from foe, ordered Kirk to wait for the atmosphere to clear. Time would not be completely wasted, for the cannoneers of Battery E, would be able to take advantage of the fog's protective mantle, to emplace their guns on a hill overlooking the spot, where Stanley thought the masked Confederate battery was located. Johnson also made use of this hiatus to bring forward another brigade-Colonel Philemon P. Baldwin's, which was deployed in double line of battle to the right of the pike - the 1st Ohio and 6th Indiana in front, the 5th Kentucky and 93d Ohio in reserve.²⁸

General Wood was troubled by the intelligence that the bluecoats were seeking to emplace a battery on the commanding elevation within 500 yards of his masked battery. Furthermore the general had learned from Wharton that the Union cavalry had appeared in considerable strength on the Confederates' flanks. Realizing that he who hesitated is lost,

Wood decided to withdraw the 45th Mississippi and the section of the Jefferson Flying Artillery from their advance position. Wharton's troops and the men of the 45th Mississippi would cover the artillery as it was removed to the rear. When reformed Wood's main line of resistance centered on the hill immediately south of Triune. The 16th Alabama took position behind a stone wall southwest of town, near the Franklin road. Six cannons (four manned by the men of the Jefferson Flying Artillery and the others by White's men) were massed near the Eagleville pike. The cannoneers trained their pieces on the approach to Nelsons Creek, which lay athwart the Yankees' line of advance. Wharton's cavalry would cover Wood's flanks, while the 33d Alabama Infantry was stationed on the Eagleville pike, several miles south of Triune, to keep open the Confederates' line of retreat.²⁹

By 1 p.m. the fog had partially lifted. McCook ordered the advance resumed. Skirmishing constantly with Wharton's troops and the men of the 45th Mississippi the Federals drove forward. Within a short time the bluecoated line of battle seized the ridge of overlooking the village of Triune. Once the men of the 45th Mississippi had retired across Nelsons Creek, Wood had the bridge demolished. This assignment being carried out by a demolition team, commanded by Captain J. W. Green.

From their vantage point the boys in blue could easily pinpoint the Confederates' main line of resistance. In hopes of silencing the six Rebel guns covering the approaches to Nelsons Creek, Kirk ordered the cannoneers of Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery to put four of their

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James rifles in position. The Union gunners then opened fire on the butternuts with shot and shell. Lacking any rifled artillery, with which to reply to the Union bombardment, Wood ordered his artillerists to limber up their pieces, and retire behind the crest of the ridge overlooking Triune. Hardly had the greyclad gunners reached their supposed haven of safety, than they learned that a strong force of Union cavalry was approaching from the west. Fortunately for the Southerners it now started to sleet and hail. McCook decided that an advance at the moment would be most hazardous, and ordered Johnson not to attack until the storm had abated.³⁰

The mounted force which the butternuts had sighted approaching from the west was a combat patrol, consisting of four companies of the 3d Indiana and a company of the 15th Pennsylvania. Crossing Nelsons Creek to the west of Triune, undetected by Wharton's troopers, the blue-clads sought to turn the Confederates' left flank. However, the Federals ran into a hornet's nest, when they encountered the detachment of the 16th Alabama posted behind the stone wall. Moving across an open field to attack the Alabamans, the Yankees drew the fire of the Confederate artillery. This proved too much for the cavalymen and they fell back in confusion.³¹

While the storm was still raging Wharton and Wood conferred briefly. The two officers realized only too well, that with their limited force it would be impossible to check the advance of McCook's powerful mile long line of battle, when it should resume its forward

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movement. Accordingly the artillery was ordered to the rear. And not a moment too soon for the storm suddenly stopped. McCook gave the word. The Union line of battle started forward. Only sporadic resistance was encountered. But the pace of the Union advance was greatly retarded by other factors - the muddy condition of the terrain, and the sodden state of the men's uniforms. On reaching Nelsons Creek, the infantry found it no barrier, and easily forded the stream. But for the artillery, it was different - a mile detour was necessary before a suitable ford was found. The Rebel brass used this delay to a good advantage. Wood's infantrymen, covered by Wharton's cavalry, making good their escape down the Eagleville pike.³²

As it was starting to get dark the bluecoats quickly gave up the chase. Johnson's troops and Stanley's cavalrymen camping for the night, a mile south of Triune. During the day McCook's two other divisions - Sheridan's and Davis' - had followed in close supporting distance of Johnson's. Nightfall on the 27th found Sheridan's in occupation of Triune, and Davis' in position at Eole Jack Pass.

Wood kept his men on the road until dark, by which time they had reached a point three miles north of Eagleville. Here he permitted them to bivouac. During the night Wood received orders from Hardee to rejoin Cleburne's division, at Murfreesboro on the morrow. Wharton's troopers spent the night of the 27th, midway between Triune and Eagleville.³³

Rosecrans satisfied by the intelligence received from McCook that Hardee had retreated, ordered Thomas to join Crittenden on Stewarts Creek. The heavy rainfall had rendered the Wilson pike all but impassable on the

27th. Therefore it took one of Thomas' divisions - Rousseau's - the entire day to move from Owen's store to Nolensville. Negley's division, which had reached Nolensville on the previous evening, remained in the village until 10 a.m., when its supply train arrived. The division then moved eastward over a terrible road. Negley's unit reached Stewartsboro late in the evening, going into position on Crittenden's right. Thomas, deeply perturbed by Rousseau's snail like progress, decided it would be best to keep Walker off the Wilson pike. Orders were drafted directing Walker to retrace his steps toward Nashville from Brentwood. Upon reaching Nashville, Walker would utilize the Nolensville pike as his line of advance.³⁴

During the day Colonel Zahm's brigade, which for the moment was operating with Thomas' corps, was quite active. A strong combat patrol composed of the 1st Ohio and a detachment of the 4th Ohio, led by Colonel Minor Milliken, left the Wilson pike camp ground - its mission a forced reconnaissance in the direction of Triune. Establishing contact with one of Wharton's outposts five miles northwest of Triune, the blueclads scattered the butternuts to the winds, capturing six of them. Milliken's patrol then returned to camp.

Shortly after the departure of Milliken's command, Zahm had sent out a battalion of the 3d Ohio to see if the Confederates had reoccupied Franklin. North of the Big Harpeth River the Yankees encountered an enemy picket line. These outposts were quickly driven in. However, the Union advance was quickly checked, when it encountered the greyclads' main line of resistance. Satisfied that the 4th Tennessee Cavalry and Davis' Tennessee Battalion had again occupied Franklin, the Federals

returned to their base. Except for sending out these two strong combat patrols. Zahm's brigade remained in its camp on the 27th.

The men of Crittenden's corps were mustered an hour and one-half before daybreak on the 27th. Following a hasty breakfast the troops were formed under arms and in order of battle. Once it was light enough to see, the Confederate artillery (Wiggins' battery) emplaced near Lavergne, commenced to shell the left bank of Hurricane Creek, where the Federal officers were marshalling their units. Crittenden, having been advised by Rosecrans that his corps had advanced more rapidly than the Army of the Cumberland's other corps, decided to postpone his forward movement until the late forenoon.

At 11 a.m. Crittenden decided he had waited long enough. The corps commander gave the order to move forward. The division, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood, would spearhead Crittenden's advance. Several minutes before the attack was scheduled to commence, Wood's troops moved into the bridgeheads on the right bank of Hurricane Creek, which Palmer's soldiers had established the previous evening. Wood formed his division as follows: Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall's brigade would take the lead; Colonels George D. Wagner's and Charles G. Harker's brigades would follow, moving forward on either side of the Nashville pike. Their mission to sustain Hascall's brigade, and cover its flanks. Colonel Kennett, accompanied by Minty's brigade, had reported to Wood for orders. The general, satisfied that the wooded undulating terrain was not conducive to cavalry

operations, instructed the cavalry officers to form their men on the flanks of Hascall's brigade. The 3d Kentucky and a company of the 2d Indiana took position on the infantry brigade's left, while the 4th Michigan covered its right.³⁶

Upon moving into position Hascall formed his brigade in double line of battle. His initial line had the 58th Indiana on the right and the 26th Ohio on the left - the Hoosiers being supported by the 3d Kentucky and the Buckeyes by the 100th Illinois. The 8th Indiana Battery was flanked by the 58th Indiana and 26th Ohio.

These dispositions having been made, Hascall prepared to carry out his instructions which were to drive down the Nashville pike, reach Stewarts Creek, and capture the bridge before it could be destroyed by the retreating Rebels. Covered by a strong skirmish line Hascall's brigade moved forward toward its initial objective - Lavergne. Emerging from the woods into the large open fields fronting the town, Hascall's battle line encountered a brisk fire from Maney's and Wheeler's sharpshooters, who were sheltered behind trees, fences, and in buildings. In an effort to escape the enemy's fire Hascall's men hit the ground. The general, realizing that it would probably be less costly in the long run if he assaulted immediately, barked out the command to charge! In the twinkling of an eye, the bluecoated infantrymen sprang to their feet, fixed bayonets, and surged forward, shouting wildly. Within five minutes' time the bluecoats had driven the Confederates from the town, and occupied the ridge beyond. In the very successful attack Hascall

had lost 27 men, all wounded.³⁷

After pausing briefly to let his men catch their breath and readjust their lines Hascall pushed on, leaving the care of his wounded and the mopping up operations to his supporting units. Hascall's pursuing Yankees hung close to the heels of the picked detachments covering Wheeler's and Maney's retreating brigades. About one and one-half miles beyond Lavergne, Hascall discovered that his initial battle line was becoming badly fagged out. In addition many of the men of the 26th Ohio had thrown away their knapsacks. Hascall then ordered his second line to take the lead, while sending a detail to collect the knapsacks. Before gaining the ridge overlooking Stewarts Creek, Hascall's forward progress was brought up short at least half a dozen times by Confederate roadblocks, supported by Wiggins' battery. Whenever this happened, Hascall called for artillery support. And this was readily furnished by the dependable 8th Indiana Battery. Since they were fighting a delaying action, the buttermuts would break off these sporadic engagements, and fall back before being too deeply committed.³⁸

Nearing Stewarts Creek, Hascall's men were first exposed to the fire of Smith's Mississippi Battery, which was assigned to Maney's brigade. A section of 6-pounder guns belonging to the 8th Indiana Battery were brought forward, and returned the Confederates' fire. Badly out-ranged by the Rebels' four 12-pounder guns, the Hoosiers were forced to withdraw their pieces. Taking cognizance of the fact that the 8th Indiana did not have any rifled artillery, Hascall sent to the

rear for another battery. In response to the general's plea several 10-pounder Parrott rifles belonging either to the 10th Indiana Battery or the 6th Ohio Battery were put into action. These long ranged hard-hitting pieces quickly neutralized the greyclads' fire.³⁹

While the artillery duel was in progress, Hascall's scouts discovered that the buttermuts, preparatory for its destruction, had packed the covered bridge that spanned Stewarts Creek with rails and other combustibles, and applied the torch to it. A call for volunteers to extinguish the blaze was made. This call was eagerly answered by the men constituting the 3d Kentucky's skirmish line and Company B, 26th Ohio Infantry. Dashing forward the volunteers, in spite of the fire of Confederate snipers, put out the fire. The vital bridge was saved. As it was beginning to get dark, Hascall stationed the 3d Kentucky at the bridge. The general then proceeded to post the other units of his hard-fighting brigade in close supporting distance. While Hascall was doing this, his left flank was attacked by a detachment of the 51st Alabama Cavalry, led by Lieutenant J. J. Seawell. These Southerners isolated by the capture of the bridge, were endeavoring to cut their way through the Union lines. However, this was vain hope, for Hascall quickly alerted his command. The Rebels, 24 in all, were driven into a fence corner, where they surrendered. After this brief flurry of excitement, Hascall permitted his men to camp for the night.⁴⁰

Several miles southeast of Lavergne, the Jefferson pike diverged from the Nashville pike. The Union brass not knowing whether or not

Hascall would be able to seize the Stewarts Creek bridge, before the butternuts could destroy it, decided to send a force to capture the bridge which carried the Jefferson pike over Stewarts Creek. Colonel Hazen was placed in charge of a task force consisting of his own brigade, Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, and a battalion of the 4th Michigan cavalry, and ordered to carry out this assignment. Two brigades of Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve's division-Colonels Samuel Beatty's and James P. Fyffe's - would camp at the junction ready to move to Hazen's help if the need should arise.⁴¹

Screened by the cavalry, Hazen's task force moved off at 12 noon. About one and one-half miles east of the junction, the Michiganders encountered a detachment of greyclads covering the retreat of the 51st Alabama Cavalry, which was in the process of retiring down the Jefferson pike. After firing a harmless volley the pickets skedaddled. In accordance with instructions previously received from Hazen, the troopers dug their spurs into their horses' flank and set off in rapid pursuit of the fleeing butternuts. A regular steeple-chase ensued as the Northerners thundered along in pursuit of the fleeing Rebels. The Confederate rear-guard soon overtook their parent unit - the 51st Alabama. The panic proved to be contagious, quickly spreading through the column, which stampeded across the bridge spanning Stewarts Creek. Company L, 4th Michigan Cavalry swept across the bridge in the wake of the fleeing Confederates. Subsequently Captain Frank W. Mix, the leader of the Michiganders, expressed himself as certain, that had his men been armed

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with sabers instead of rifles, many of the Confederates would have been cut-off and captured. Having secured the bridge, Mix sent a messenger dashing to the rear to acquaint Hazen with the situation. The captain then deployed his 90 men to resist the inevitable Confederate counter-attack - pending Hazen's arrival. Colonel John T. Morgan had considerable difficulty in rallying his command. And when the Alabamans' made their initial counter thrust it was easily beaten back. Before the Rebels could organize a second attack, Hazen reached the bridge with the remainder of his task force. The cannoneers of Battery F, 1st Ohio Light Artillery unlimbered their six pieces. Opening fire the Union artillery quickly forced the men of the 51st Alabama to withdraw from the immediate area. The bridge secured, Hazen permitted the men of his task force to bivouac for the night. In the clash at the bridge, the bluecoats had suffered three casualties - all missing. In addition to several killed and wounded the Alabamans had ten of their number captured in the engagement.⁴²

Nightfall on the 27th found all of Crittenden's corps, except for the two brigades posted at the junction of the Jefferson and Nashville pikes massed along the left bank of Stewarts Creek. Furthermore Crittenden had been augmented by the arrival of Negley's division. Especially satisfying to the Federal brass, had been their success in capturing in tact the two brigades which spanned Stewarts Creek, and the establishment of bridgeheads on the stream's right bank.

Wheeler's cavalry and Maney's infantry following their retreat

across Stewarts Creek had taken positions covering the approaches to Over-
all Creek. So rapid had been the Confederate evacuation of the Stewarts
Creek line that they had left behind a considerable amount of equipment
(tents and arms) which fell into the Federals' hands.⁴³

To determine whether Hardee had retreated toward Shellyville or
Murfreesboro, McCook on the 28th, ordered Johnson to have one of his
brigades make a forced reconnaissance down the Shelbyville pike. Johnson
detailed the brigade, commanded by Brigadier General August Willich to
carry out this mission. Stanley's cavalry, accompanied Willich's troops
as they trudged southward from Triune. At College Grove, the blue-
coats were able to ascertain, that the large Confederate force formerly
stationed there had made a hurried departure. The Federals followed
Cleburne's line of march to the vicinity of Eagleville. Here the Union
officers found unmistakable signs indicating that the greyclads had
turned into a county road which gave access to the Salem pike. Satisfied
that Hardee had moved his command to Murfreesboro, the Northerners
retraced their steps. Reaching Triune, Stanley and Willich relayed this
information to McCook. During the course of the forced reconnaissance,
the Federals had encountered no organized resistance, but had bagged
themselves 41 prisoners - stragglers from Wharton's and Wood's commands.⁴⁴
Save for the activities of this task force the remainder of McCook's
corps spent a quite Sabbath in their camps.⁴⁵

Wharton's cavalry brigade, which was covering Wood's march to
Murfreesboro, moved to Salem on the 28th. Colonel Baxter Smith, with

the 4th Tennessee and Davis' Tennessee Battalion moved from Franklin to Eagleville. Wharton had delegated to Smith the responsibility of keeping tab of McCook's movements. Smith's scouts quickly spotted the movement of the Stanley-Willich task force. Wharton, upon learning from Smith, that the task force had returned to Triune, decided that Rosecrans' master plan did not call for a flanking movement against Bragg's army, then in the process of concentrating at Murfreesboro. Unless he received orders to the contrary from Bragg, Wharton informed Polk on the night of the 28th, that he would establish his headquarters on the Wilkinson pike, with his left resting on the Salem pike and his right on Wheeler's left. Since Bragg raised no objection to Wharton's plan, the Texan proceeded to implement it on the morning of the 29th.⁴⁶

Thomas on the 28th endeavored to concentrate his corps at Stewartsboro. Both Negley's wagon train and Rousseau's division, overcoming the "exceedingly rough" roads, succeeded in reaching the Stewarts Creek staging area from Nolensville during the day. However, Rousseau's train and Walker's brigade, as a result of the terrible marching conditions, were unable to get beyond Nolensville.⁴⁷ Zahm's cavalry brigade, which had been operating with Thomas' corps, left its Wilson pike encampment, and proceeded to Triune. Upon reaching Triune, Zahm reported to General Stanley, and then permitted his men to camp for the night.⁴⁸

Crittenden's corps, except for the troops occupying the two bridgeheads, remained in position along the left bank of Stewarts Creek throughout the day. The corps was marking time while Thomas' and McCook's

men were being moved into position. Only when these two corps had reached their assigned jumping off points, would the Army of the Cumberland resume the offensive. Several times during the day sporadic skirmishing developed, between the Union outposts and combat patrols drawn from Wheeler's and Maney's brigade. But since neither side wished to goad the other into a full-fledged fight, these fire fights were of short duration. During the day the Union brass relieved Captain Mix's battalion, which was serving with Hazen's task force, with a battalion drawn from the 7th Pennsylvania. About dusk a reconnaissance patrol from the 3d Kentucky headed southward from the Stewarts Creek staging area, to see if the Confederates were covering the Bole Jack Road, which would serve as McCook's line of advance toward Murfreesboro. Before they had gone very far the Kentuckians encountered one of Wharton's patrols. Judging it unsafe to proceed any further, Colonel Eli H. Murray's patrol returned to their camp.⁴⁹

On Sunday morning Bragg issued instructions directing the three infantry brigades, which were supporting his cavalry, to rejoin their divisions. By dark the designated units, commanded respectively by Wood, Maney and Loomis, had reached Murfreesboro. Bragg now had all of his army, except for the cavalry, concentrated in front of Murfreesboro, ready to accept the gage of battle.⁵⁰

After a day's rest, McCook's troops felt considerably refreshed. Both the rank and file expressed the hope that the absence of any rainfall during the past 36 hours, would serve to greatly improve the roads.

According to the instructions received from Rosecrans, McCook would leave one brigade at Triune and move the remainder of his corps toward Murfreesboro, using the Bole Jack road as his line of advance. Baldwin's brigade, supported by a section of artillery drawn from the 5th Indiana Battery, was the unit designated by McCook to remain at Triune. Since Davis' division had camped at the point where the Bole Jack road diverged from the Triune pike, his division took the lead as the corps drove eastward. Davis' division was followed in order named, by Sheridan's and Johnson's. Since the Bole Jack road was not macadamized, as was the pike, the soldiers, contrary to their expectations, found the going difficult, for the road had not completely dried.⁵¹

Stanley, whose cavalry command would screen McCook's advance, divided his force as follows: Colonel Zahm's brigade would move due east from Triune using the Franklin road as the axis of its advance; the general, accompanied by the reserve cavalry, would move along the Bole Jack road. Before crossing Stewarts Creek the two cavalry commands would communicate with each other before moving on. Zahm before leaving Triune divided his brigade into three column. His right regiment - the 4th Ohio would move via the Franklin road, his left - the 1st Ohio would be within view of the troops advancing on the Bole Jack road, and his center - the 3d Ohio would be separated from the other two regiments by from one to one and one-half miles, depending on the terrain. Scouts and flankers were thrown out and the advance commenced.⁵²

Nothing out of the ordinary happened until the Union Cavalry had

penetrated to within a mile of Stewarts Creek. Here the 3d Ohio encountered one of Wharton's outposts. After a brisk skirmish the Confederates beat a hasty retreat. The union troopers quickly secured the bridge across Stewarts Creek. Before pushing on Stanley sent a messenger to advise Davis that the cavalry had contacted the foe. Once his vanguard had reached Stewarts Creek, Davis was ordered to halt his division until Sheridan and Johnson had closed up.⁵³

Meanwhile the troopers had continued to push relentlessly onward. Several miles beyond Stewarts Creek, Zahm again contacted the foe. This time all three of his columns became more or less simultaneously engaged, with roving patrols sent out by General Wharton. These were driven in, and the Federals continued to press forward. Approaching the north-south road connecting Wilkinson's Cross-Roads with the Franklin road, the bluecoated troopers encountered Wharton's main line of resistance. Attacking down the Wilkinson pike, Stanley's command hurled the Rebels across Overall Creek.

Cheering wildly the Yankees - the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry in the lead - crossed the creek close on the heels of the retreating Southerners. The reckless Pennsylvanians spurred their horses to within one-half mile of Bragg's infantry's line of battle. Here the bluecoats encountered a combat patrol drawn from the 10th and 19th South Carolina Consolidated Infantry, of Colonel Arthur M. Manigault's brigade. The sturdy South Carolinians opened a devastating fire on the Pennsylvanians. In addition to the regimental commander - Major Adolph Rosengarten - six of the bluecoats were killed and another half dozen

wounded. Panic stricken by this sudden turn of events, the Pennsylvanians bolted for the rear. The regiment was so disconcerted by this experience that it was rendered valueless during the remainder of the campaign.

Following this repulse Stanley used the reserve brigade to feel for Crittenden's corps on his left. Before nightfall the 2d Tennessee had established contact with Minty's brigade, and the Army of the Cumberland had once again established contact between its wings.⁵⁴

South of the Wilkinson pike, Zahm's troopers forced Wharton's thinly spread brigade to retire to the east side of Overall Creek. Forging the stream the Federals, in a series of sharp clashes, drove the Rebels across Puckett Creek. As he ascended the rise that lay to the east of Puckett Creek, Zahm was forced to concentrate his brigade to resist a counterattack launched by the vigorous Wharton. Once the Rebels had been repulsed, Zahm sighted McCown's and Withers' powerful lines of battle. Believing discretion the better part of valor, Zahm ordered his men to retire. After picketing the crossing of Overall Creek, Zahm's brigade bivouacked for the night near the Beggley Lane Church, on the road which connected the Franklin road with Wilkinson's Cross-Roads.

Wharton after checking Zahm's advance, concentrated his brigade near Salem, where he permitted his men to bivouac for the night. Wharton felt that Salem would be a good base from which to operate against McCook's rear, and at the same time cover the left flank of Bragg's main line of resistance.⁵⁵

After McCook had received word from General Stanley that the cavalry was approaching Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, he told Davis to hit the road. The Union infantry, without incident, reached Wilkinson's Cross-Roads. Here McCook deployed his command - Sheridan to the left of the Wilkinson pike, Davis to the right, and Johnson in reserve. Davis' division moved forward, and took position overlooking Overall Creek - Woodruff's brigade guarding the bridge. As a precautionary measure, the troops bivouacked for the night in line of battle. Before retiring for the night, McCook sent a staff officer scurrying toward Triune, with orders for Baldwin to rejoin the corps on the morrow.⁵⁶

Having received instructions from Rosecrans to resume the advance, Crittenden turned his men out at an early hour on the 29th. In accordance with the plan of operations drawn up by Crittenden - Wood's division would move forward on the left of the Nashville pike, Palmer's on the right, with Van Cleve's in close supporting distance. Preparatory to taking up the advance, Wood deployed his division as follows: Colonel Wagner's brigade, supported by the 10th Indiana Battery, was formed into line of battle, its right flank resting on the Nashville pike; Colonel Harker's also in line of battle, was placed in echelon on Wagner's left; Hascall's brigade, in column of fours, would constitute the reserve. General Palmer had Colonel William Grose from his brigade in double line of battle, on Wagner's left. Cruft's brigade, deployed in line of battle, took position to the left and rear of Grose's. Palmer's other brigade - commanded by Hazen - which guarded the Jefferson

pike bridge across Stewarts Creek was alerted to rejoin the division. But at H-hour which was scheduled for 10 a.m. Hazen's unit had not yet put in an appearance. Negley's division, of Thomas' corps, would ford Stewarts Creek at a point two miles south of where the Nashville pike crossed the stream. Negley's mission - to support the right flank of Crittenden's division as it drove toward Murfreesboro.

Since there was the possibility a heavy engagement with Bragg's army, the cavalry would not screen the Union advance, being used instead to cover the flanks of Crittenden's corps as it drove forward. Therefore Minty, in accordance with Kennett's instructions, placed the 7th Pennsylvania on the left; the 3d Kentucky on the right; while the 4th Michigan would constitute a reserve; the 2d Indiana was detailed for courier duty.⁵⁷

Before crossing Stewarts Creek in force, Crittenden decided it might be a good idea to have his artillery, first soften up Wheeler's position. The eight guns of Batteries H and M, 4th U. S. Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Charles C. Parsons were wheeled into position on the ridge overlooking Stewarts Creek. After several shells had been dropped into the woods on the opposite ridge, the Confederate pickets could be seen deserting their place of concealment and scampering for the rear. Parsons then ordered his battery to cease firing.

Once the artillery had fallen silent, Wood and Palmer waved their men forward. Covered by a strong skirmish line, the bluebladed battle lines moved resolutely forward. As the bridge was to be kept open for

the use of the artillery and supporting units, the infantry waded the waist-deep creek. Reaching the right bank, the Federal line of battle pushed forward, Palmer's troops evidently moved faster than Wood's and Negley's. By the time his command had pushed to a point one and one-half miles beyond the creek, Palmer realizing that he was unsupported on both the left and right, called a halt. In addition Wheeler's troops supported by Wiggins' battery had commenced to contest Grose's advance. Parsons' battery now put in an appearance. Palmer ordered it into action. The regulars unlimbered their four 3-inch rifles and opened fire on the Confederates. Badly out ranged the Rebel artillerists quickly withdrew their pieces. Wood's division now drew abreast of Palmer's, and the advance was resumed. In spite of several brisk clashes with Wheeler's troops, the Union infantry forged cautiously forward.⁵⁸

In the face of only sporadic and scattered resistance from Wheeler's rearguard, the Federal line of battle waded across Overall Creek. Upon gaining the stream's right bank Palmer's and Wood's troops pushed on toward Murfreesboro. On emerging from the clump of cedars, which within 48 hours would gain fame as the Round Forest, the Union skirmishers sighted the Rebel battle line dug in along a ridge one-half mile to their immediate front. Furthermore the bluecoats realized that from the increased tempo of the skirmishing, that they were no longer opposed by cavalry. And they were correct.

For upon reaching the proximity of the Confederate main line of resistance Wheeler, in compliance with orders from Bragg, had assembled

his brigade. Passing through the Rebel lines, the cavalrymen forded Stones River. Proceeding out the Lebanon pike to a point some three-quarters of a mile in front of Breckinridge's main line of resistance, Wheeler deployed his troopers into line of battle, to the right of the road. The skirmishers that the Yankees were now contending with were the hard-bitten men of the 9th Mississippi Sharpshooter Battalion. When the cavalry had been withdrawn, Brigadier General James P. Chalmers had sent the sharpshooters forward to take up positions near the Cowan house.⁵⁹

By the time that they had sighted Bragg's powerful line of battle both Wood and Palmer had learned that Negley's division, unable to work its way through the cedar breaks, had been forced to move along the pike. Considerable time had been lost in reaching the pike, and at the moment Negley's vanguard was several miles to the rear. Van Cleve's division, which was following Negley's, was even farther from the front. Furthermore the two generals had been unable to obtain any information concerning the location of McCook's corps. Therefore Palmer and Wood decided to hold their troops where they were, until they had checked with Crittenden.

Up until this moment all the signs had seemed to indicate to the Union brass, that the Army of Tennessee would give up Murfreesboro without a fight. But the sight of the Confederate army drawn up in imposing battle array served to disenchant Palmer and Wood. Wood, as the ranking officer, did not deem it proper to precipitate an engagement with the foe, while the other units of the Army of Cumberland were so far in the

rear, that they would be unable to render support in case of a serious reverse. Furthermore it was about 4 p.m., and an attempt to advance over ground which had not been reconnoitered, in the face of a vigorous foe, would have been most hazardous. Crittenden upon his arrival at the front approved Wood's decision not to attack, while waiting for supplemental instructions from Rosecrans, who was several miles in the rear.⁶⁰

Rosecrans having received a message from Palmer sent at 3 p.m. stating that he was in sight of Murfreesboro, and that the enemy was running, replied to Crittenden's dispatch: "Occupy Murfreesborough, if you can, with one division. Encamp main body of troops on this side, as before directed". Upon receipt of Rosecrans' order, Crittenden directed Wood to occupy Murfreesboro with his division. Palmer's division would keep pace with Wood's unit pending the establishment of a bridgehead on the east bank of Stones River. After having received Crittenden's order, Wood's reiterated his opinion, that as it was getting quite dark it would be most dangerous to cross the river. The division commander then suggested that Crittenden "ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order". Crittenden agreed with Wood that the operation would be most hazardous, "but as the success of the whole army might depend on the prompt execution of orders by every officer, it was my duty to advance". Immediately after Wood had ordered his division forward, both he and Palmer again approached Crittenden, and urged him to suspend the order to attack. Crittenden refused to rescind the order, but consented to hold it in abeyance until General

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Rosecrans could be acquainted with the situation. Shortly thereafter Rosecrans rode up. After listening to Crittenden's explanation, he gave his stamp of approval to this subordinate's decision.⁶¹

At the time that the word to move forward reached Wood's division it was deployed in double line of battle as follows: Wagner's brigade in the wood; subsequently known as Round Forest, its right flank resting on the Nashville pike; Harker's brigade on Wagner's left, its right flank extending into the woods, the remainder of the unit in an open field, fronting a ford; Hascall's brigade was posted on Harker's left, with his left resting on Stones River, near McFadden's Ford. Palmer's division was massed in double line of battle to Wood's right - Grose on the left, Cruft on the right.⁶²

Harker's brigade, covered by a strong skirmish line, had moved forward before the arrival of Crittenden's orders suspending the attack. Reaching the ford the bluecoated skirmishers, without a moment's hesitation, waded across. With a bridgehead established, Harker issued instructions for the 51st and 73d Indiana, and 13th Michigan to cross simultaneously. Once these units had reached the east bank they were quickly formed into a line of battle, and pressed forward - their objective to seize the commanding heights beyond. After covering the crossing of their comrades in arms, the remainder of Harker's brigade- the 64th and 65th Ohio, accompanied by the 6th Ohio Battery, forded the river.⁶³

The commanding elevation against which Harker had launched his attack was known as Wayne's Hill. This strategic hill had been unoccupied

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until mid-afternoon on the 29th. Following the withdrawal of Wheeler's cavalry, one of Breckinridge's brigade commanders - Brigadier General Roger W. Hanson - had placed Colonel Thomas H. Hunt in charge of a special task force composed of the 6th and 9th Kentucky, 41st Alabama, Cobb's Kentucky Battery, and a section of the 5th Battery, Washington Light Artillery. With this force Hunt moved forward and took possession of Wayne's Hill. The eight Rebel guns were posted on the crest of the hill, the 6th Kentucky took position on the battery's right, the 9th Kentucky on the cannoners' left, and the 41st Alabama in support. Skirmishers were thrown forward, taking position behind a rail fence flanking the river.⁶⁴

After the Northern skirmishers had crossed the river they drew the fire of the Rebel snipers, ensconced behind the fence and hidden in the thickets to their front. Undaunted the bluecoats surged forward, driving the greyclads before them. The butternuts hurriedly retired on their main line of resistance atop Wayne's Hill. Soon the Union line of battle emerged from the woods into the cornfield which lay at the base of the Wayne's Hill. It seemed to Harker that his bold crossing of Stones River had completely disconcerted the foe, as their outposts fellback in confusion before his advance. From a prisoner, Harker learned that Breckinridge's entire division was massed within close supporting distance of the Confederates on the hill. Harker relayed this interesting bit of intelligence to General Wood, advising him that he could hold the position gained until reinforced. By this time the bluecoats

had succeeded in establishing their forward positions within 30 paces of the butternuts' main line of resistance. But here the greyclads' fire brought them to a halt. Indeed the Northerners were close enough to hear the Southern officers exhorting their men in "the name of their 'country and their rights' to make" a counterattack. However, it seems that this appeal fell on deaf ears, for no sortie was made. Orders soon arrived from headquarters, directing Harker to recross the river. This the Federals did without difficulty, occupying the same ground as they had before the attack. Union casualties in this limited attack were 2 killed and 3 wounded. In repulsing Harker's attack, the Rebel brass reported they had lost "not less than 10 wounded".⁶⁵

By the time that Harker's brigade had retired to the left bank of Stones River, the remainder of Crittenden's corps and Negley's division, of Thomas' corps, had arrived on the scene. Except for Hazen's brigade which camped for the night in rear of Grose's, the men of Wood's and Palmer's division slept in line of battle. Negley's and Van Cleve's divisions bivouacked for the night, in close supporting distance of Crittenden's main line of resistance. Once the Union advance came to a halt, Colonel Kennett had Minty assemble the cavalry brigade, and camp it immediately in rear of Crittenden's line of battle.⁶⁶

On the 29th Thomas remained at Stewartsboro with Rousseau's division. The withdrawal of Hazen's task force from the Jefferson pike bridge across Stewarts Creek, would leave the Union rear exposed to Confederate cavalry raids. The Union brass theorized that if the Con-

federate cavalry should strike at the Army of the Cumberland's supply lines, it would probably cross Stones River at Jefferson. Therefore, Thomas directed Rousseau to send one of his brigades to Jefferson. Accordingly the brigade, commanded by Colonel John C. Starkweather, was transferred from Stewartsboro to Jefferson. Walker's brigade and train was delayed in leaving Nolensville, by the necessity of having to wait while the men of the 1st Regiment of Michigan Engineers and Mechanics had completed a bridge across Mill Creek. The bridge was declared completed by 11 a.m., and Walker's command was able to resume the march to Stewartsboro, where it arrived about dark.⁶⁷

Nightfall on the 29th found both the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee concentrated northwest of Murfreesboro prepared to accept the gage of battle. During the Union approach march, only two of the four cavalry brigades - Wheeler's and Wharton's - which were operating with Bragg's army, at the moment, had engaged the foe. Pegram's brigade, which had been posted on Fall Creek covering the Lebanon pike was recalled by Bragg on the afternoon of the 29th. Bragg had decided that with a powerful enemy host concentrating northwest of Murfreesboro, that the strong Union force stationed at Gallatin, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph J. Reynolds, did not pose an immediate threat to the Army of Tennessee. Falling back Pegram's troopers took position east of the Lebanon pike, and several hundred yards in advance of Breckinridge's main line of resistance. Patrols were thrown out to picket the various crossing of Stones River that lay to the north and west of

of Bragg's line of battle.

Upon learning of the Yankees' advance, Bragg had ordered Buford's brigade from McMinnville to Rover. Here Buford's brigade would be in an excellent position to watch the Union force that had occupied Triune. If Rosecrans' master plan called for McCook to turn the Army of Tennessee's left, Buford from his base at Rover, would be able to pinpoint the movement immediately. Since Buford's brigade did not have any attached artillery, a section of the Eufaula Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant W. J. McKenzie, was sent to Rover on the 29th.⁶⁸

In his official report of the Stones River campaign submitted on February 23, Bragg wrote:

On Sunday, the 28th, our main force of infantry and artillery was concentrated in front of Murfreesboro, while the cavalry, supported by three brigades of infantry and three batteries of artillery, impeded the advance of the enemy by constant skirmishing and sudden and unexpected attacks. To the skillful manner in which the cavalry, thus ably supported, was handled, and to the exceeding gallantry of its officers and men, must be attributed the four days' time consumed by the enemy in reaching the battle-field, a distance of only 20 miles from his encampments, over fine macadamized roads.⁶⁹

To the dispassionate observer it would seem that Bragg went slightly overboard in his report of the Confederate cavalry's activities during the Army of the Cumberland's advance upon Murfreesboro. It would appear that a number of other factors, besides the resistance offered by Wheeler's and Wharton's troopers, and their supporting infantry and artillery, were responsible for the cautious pace of the Union advance. First, there were the heavy rains that fell on the 26th and 27th, which

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made marching conditions most difficult. Second, Hardee's presence in the Triune area, made it necessary for Rosecrans to divide his force as it moved out of the Nashville defenses. To prevent one of his corps from being isolated by the Rebels, and his army defeated in detail, it was necessary for Rosecrans to carefully regulate the advance of his respective columns. While the Nashville and Nolensville pikes were macadamized a number of the side roads (Edmondson pike, Wilson pike, and Bole Jack road, etc.) utilized by the Federals as they pushed forward were not. And these secondary roads were quickly turned into quagmires by the heavy rains. At no time during the Army of the Cumberland's approach march did the resistance of the Confederate cavalry prevent any of Rosecrans' units from reaching its assigned objective. However, "General Mud" succeeded where the Rebels failed, and in their struggles with this formidable opponent several of the Union commands were bested. Therefore these units, at times, were delayed by mother nature and not the Confederage cavalry, in reaching their assigned objectives.

Notes

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

Chapter I

CAVALRY OPERATIONS DURING THE UNION APPROACH MARCH

- 1 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 663, 772, 843, 911, (Cited hereafter as O. R.).
- 2 Ibid., 132, 154, 663; O. R., Series I, Vol. XVII, pt. I, 591-597.
- 3 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 663, 958. Joseph Wheeler was born at Augusta, Georgia, on September 10, 1836, and was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1859. Upon his graduation 2d Lieutenant Wheeler was assigned to duty at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Subsequently he was transferred to New Mexico. Learning of Georgia's withdrawal from the Union, Wheeler resigned from the U. S. Army. Reaching Augusta in March 1861, Wheeler was commissioned a 1st lieutenant in the Confederate artillery. The young lieutenant of artillery was assigned to duty at Pensacola. In September, Wheeler was promoted and assumed command of the 19th Alabama Infantry. The following July, Wheeler was advanced to the rank of brigadier general and transferred to the cavalry. John A. Wharton entered the Confederate service as a captain in the 8th Texas Cavalry (Terry's Rangers). In the regiment's first engagement at Woodsonville, Kentucky, on December 17, 1861, Colonel B. F. Terry was killed. Shortly thereafter Terry's successor Colonel Thomas S. Lubbock died. The regiment was then re-organized, and Wharton was elected its colonel.

Wharton participated in both the battle of Shiloh and the Kentucky Campaign. Following his return from Kentucky, Wharton was promoted to brigadier general on November 18, 1862. John Pegram, a native of Virginia, was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1854. Commissioned a brevet 2d Lieutenant in the dragoons, Pegram served on the western frontier until 1858. In that year Pegram, now a 1st Lieutenant in the 2d Dragoons, received a two years' leave of absence to enable him to make a tour of Europe. On his return from Europe, Pegram remained in the U. S. Army until May 10, 1861 when he resigned. Entering Confederate service, Pegram was advanced rapidly in rank, participating in the Western Virginia Campaign in the summer of 1861, where he was forced to surrender his command to Rosecrans' at Rich Mountain. Exchanged in the summer of 1862, Pegram was assigned to Bragg's staff. Subsequently Pegram became Kirby Smith's chief of staff. In November, Pegram was promoted to a brigadier general and placed in charge of a cavalry brigade. Abraham Buford was born in Kentucky in 1820, and graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1841. As a 1st Lieutenant in the 1st Dragoons, Buford served in the Mexican War. For gallantry and meritorious conduct at the battle of Buena Vista, Buford was brevetted a captain. Buford resigned from the army on October 22, 1854, and took up farming near Versailles, Kentucky. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Buford cast his lot with the South. During the Kentucky Campaign of the late summer and early fall of 1862, a cavalry brigade was organized in Kentucky. On September 3, 1862 Buford received his commission as a

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brigadier general, and assumed command of this newly organized brigade.

4 Ibid., 958. Wheeler's brigade consisted of the following units: 1st Alabama Cavalry, Colonel William W. Allen; 3d Alabama Cavalry, Major F. Y. Gaines; 51st Alabama Cavalry, Colonel J. T. Morgan; 8th Confederate Cavalry, Colonel W. B. Wade; Major D. W. Holman's Tennessee Cavalry Battalion; Major D. C. Douglas' Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, and Captain J. H. Wiggins' four gun Arkansas Battery.

5 Ibid., 958; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 450, 452. Pegram's brigade consisted of the 1st Georgia Cavalry, Colonel J. J. Morrison; 1st Louisiana Cavalry, Colonel J. C. Scott; 1st Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel J. E. Carter; 16th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion; Lt. Colonel J. R. Neal; Huwald's Tennessee Battery, Captain G. A. Huwald.

6 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 958; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 455, 458. Wharton's brigade was composed of the following units: 14th Alabama Cavalry Battalion, Lt. Col. J. C. Malone; 1st Confederate Cavalry, Colonel J. T. Cox; 3d Confederate Cavalry, Lt. Col. W. N. Estes; 2d Georgia, Lt. Col. J. E. Dunlop; detachment 3d Georgia Cavalry, Major R. Thompson; 2d Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel H. M. Ashby; 4th Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel B. Smith; Davis' Tennessee Battalion, Major J. R. Davis; Murray's Tennessee Regiment, Major W. S. Bledsoe; 8th Texas Cavalry, Colonel T. Harrison; 12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, Captain L. T. Hardy; White's Tennessee Battery, Captain B. F. White.

7 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 733. Maney's brigade consisted of the 1st and 27th Tennessee Infantry (Consolidated), Colonel H. R. Field; 4th Confederate Infantry, Colonel J. A. McMurry. 6th and 9th Tennessee

Infantry (Consolidated); Colonel C. S. Hurt and Smith's Mississippi Battery, Lt. W. B. Turner.

8 Ibid., 896. The force accompanying General Wood to Triune consisted of the 16th Alabama, Colonel W. B. Wood; 33d Alabama, Colonel S. Adams; 45th Mississippi, Lt. Col. R. Charlton; two companies 15th Mississippi Sharpshooter Battalion, Captain A. T. Hawkins; and the Jefferson Flying Artillery.

9 Ibid., 754; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 450; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 189-190. Loomis' brigade was made up of the 19th, 22d, 25th, 26th and 39th Alabama Infantry Regiments; the 17th Alabama Sharpshooter Battalion; the 1st Louisiana (Regulars); and Robertson's Florida Battery.

10 Ibid., 617. Minty's brigade was composed of the following units: Company M, 2d Indiana Cavalry, Captain J. A. S. Mitchell; 3d Kentucky, Colonel E. H. Murray; 4th Michigan, Lt., Col. W. H. Dickinson; 7th Pennsylvania, Major J. E. Wynkoop. The 1st Ohio, Colonel M. Milliken; 3d Ohio, Lt. Col. D. A. Murray; the 4th Ohio, Major J. L. Pugh constituted Zahm's brigade. The three newly organized regiments which reported directly to General Stanley were the 15th Pennsylvania; Major A. H. Rosengarten; the 5th Tennessee, Colonel W. B. Stones; and the 2d Tennessee, Colonel D. M. Ray. A section of Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, commanded by Lt. N. M. Newell, reported directly to Colonel Kennett. David S. Stanley, a native of Ohio, graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in the class of 1852. Commissioned a 2d lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry, Stanley held the rank of captain at the time Ft. Sumter was

fired upon. Following the outbreak of hostilities, Stanley rose rapidly in rank, being made a major general of volunteers on November 29, 1862. Robert H. G. Minty, a native of Ireland, and a resident of Michigan, at the beginning of the Civil War entered the Federal service as a major in the 2d Michigan Cavalry. Minty had been promoted to Colonel on July 31, 1862. Lewis Zahm was born in Germany, and emigrated to the United States, where he settled in Ohio. Zahm entered the Union service initially as colonel of the 3d Ohio Cavalry.

11 Ibid., 253, 262, 295, 347.

12 Ibid., 262, 269, 279, 347.

13 Ibid., 262-263, 266, 269, 279.

14 Ibid., 295, 347.

15 Ibid., 372.

16 Ibid., 446, 623, 627, 631.

18 Ibid., 958, 962, 965.

19 Ibid., 733-734.

20 Ibid., 446, 520, 526, 543, 623, 627. Colonel Hazen had been detained in Nashville by the commission investigating Major General Don C. Buell, and did not rejoin his brigade until the night of the 26th.

21 Ibid., 446, 520, 526, 543, 623, 627, 731, 958, 962, 965.

22 John P. Dyer, "Fighting Joe" Wheeler (Baton Rouge, 1941) 80.

23 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 843.

24 Ibid., 911.

25 Ibid., 896.

26 Ibid., 253.

- 27 Ibid., 253, 617, 646.
- 28 Ibid., 253, 318-319, 336-337.
- 29 Ibid., 894, 896-897, 901, 903, 906.
- 30 Ibid., 253, 319, 897.
- 31 Ibid., 646-647, 897.
- 32 Ibid., 253-254, 298, 302, 319, 328-329, 337.
- 33 Ibid., 263, 303, 319, 337, 347, 617, 897.
- 34 Ibid., 190, 372.
- 35 Ibid., 635, 639.
- 36 Ibid., 448, 458, 623.
- 37 Ibid., 464-465.
- 38 Ibid., 465, 475, 480, 482, 734, 962, 965.
- 39 Ibid., 465.
- 40 Ibid., 465-466, 475, 962, 965.
- 41 Ibid., 447, 542-543, 629.
- 42 Ibid., 521, 542-545, 629-630, 962-963.
- 43 Ibid., 459, 734, 958, 963, 965.
- 44 Ibid., 254, 303, 617.
- 45 Ibid., 254, 263, 295, 347.
- 46 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 467.
- 47 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 372.
- 48 Ibid., 635, 639.
- 49 Ibid., 448, 459, 516, 623, 958, 961, 963; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX
pt. II, 261.

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- 50 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 663; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 467.
- 51 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 254, 263, 295, 298, 337, 347.
- 52 Ibid., 617, 635.
- 53 Ibid., 254, 263, 617, 635, 639, 644.
- 54 Ibid., 617, 635, 648, 754.
- 55 Ibid., 635, 640, 643-644; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 469.
- 56 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 254, 263, 295, 347.
- 57 Ibid., 372, 448, 459, 501, 526, 560, 623.
- 58 Ibid., 459, 501, 517, 523-524, 526, 560, 958, 963.
- 59 Ibid., 459, 754, 958, 963.
- 60 Ibid., 448, 459.
- 61 Ibid., 190-191, 448; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 263-264.
- 62 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 459, 516. Grose's left flank rested on the turnpike, Cruft's brigade being posted in the edge of the woods that lay to the east of a contry lane (today's Van Cleve lane).
- 63 Ibid., 501, 511. Before crossing the river Harker's initial line of battle was deployed from left to right as follows: 13th Michigan, 51st and 73d Indiana.
- 64 Ibid., 829, 832, 835.
- 65 Ibid., 501, 507, 509-510, 511, 829, 832, 835.
- 66 Ibid., 372, 431, 516, 623.
- 67 Ibid., 372, 391, 441; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 272.
- 68 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 944, 970.
- 69 Ibid., 663.

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

CHAPTER II - Wheeler's December 30th Raid, and
Cavalry Activities on the First Day
of the Battle.

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April 1959

CAVALRY OPERATIONS -- BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

Chapter II

WHEELER'S DECEMBER 30th RAID, AND CAVALRY ACTIVITIES ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE

Wheeler's brigade had barely moved into position east of the Lebanon pike, late on the afternoon of the 29th, then the general received a message from General Bragg. Upon perusing the general's letter Wheeler found that his command, already badly jaded by four days of almost constant skirmishing with a determined foe, was directed to cross Stones River and attack Rosecrans' supply lines. One of Pegram's regiments - the 1st Tennessee Cavalry - was detailed to accompany Wheeler when he fell upon the enemy's rear. Wheeler, apparently undaunted by this assignment, alerted his unit commanders to have their men ready to march by midnight.¹

By the designated hour the various unit commanders had mustered and inspected their hardy troopers. Wheeler then gave the order to mount up. The unit commanders repeated this order, and the men swung into their saddles. It had started to rain again on the evening of the 29th. Therefore it was a thoroughly dampened column of greyclads that rode northward along the Lebanon pike, during the early morning hours of the 30th. After fording the East Fork of Stones River, the Confederates turned into the Jefferson pike.

About daybreak the van of Wheeler's column reached a point several miles east of Jefferson. Here, while his men fed their horses, Wheeler closely questioned his scouts. From those individuals he learned that

Jefferson was occupied by a strong force of Union infantry.

Hoping to avoid a head on collision with this force, Wheeler conferred briefly with several members of his command who hailed from the immediate area. Guided by these individuals, the raiders abandoned the Jefferson pike in favor of little used or frequented country lanes lying to the south of the pike. A circuitous detour enabled Wheeler's command to cross Stones River near Neal's Mill, thus by-passing Jefferson which was garrisoned by Starkweather's Union brigade. Once across the river, the Confederate column turned north - its objective to get astride the Jefferson pike. About 9 a.m. as the Rebel vanguard approached the Jefferson pike, the scouts informed Wheeler that they had spotted a large wagon train moving eastward along the road toward Jefferson. Detaching the 51st Alabama cavalry to guard the section of Wiggins' battery, which had accompanied his raiding force, Wheeler moved to attack.²

The supply train sighted by Wheeler's scouts was enroute from Stewarts Creek to Jefferson. This train belonging to Starkweather's brigade consisted of 64 wagons, loaded with camp equipage, stores, officers' baggage, knapsacks, etc., was all but unguarded. Its escort consisted of a few convalescents, seeking to rejoin their units, and a small detail sent to guard the ten wagons loaded with rations, which rolled along in the train's rear. The lead wagons had reached the Union camp at Jefferson, and were in the process of being parked, when Wheeler's grim raiders struck. A hard-hitting detachment of Wheeler's command attacked the portion of the train which had not reached the haven of safety. Simultaneously

Wheeler dismounted the remainder of his brigade, deployed the men on either side of the pike, and pressed forward toward Jefferson - his objective apparently to drive in Starkweather's brigade and destroy the entire train. However, the Union outposts were alerted in time. And they succeeded in holding the butternuts at bay, long enough to allow Starkweather to form his brigade for battle.³

While the wagoners were hurriedly parking the wagons, which had reached camp, Starkweather deployed his brigade. The 21st Wisconsin, the first unit formed, moved out on the double. The regiment's commander - Lieutenant Colonel Harrison C. Hobart - being instructed to advance along the Jefferson pike, and see if his unit could save any of the wagons, to which Wheeler's eager men could be seen applying the torch. One regiment, the 24th Illinois, and a section of artillery drawn from Battery A, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery, was sent to guard the bridge across the East Fork of Stones River. Starkweather proposed to support his "flying column" - the 21st Wisconsin with the remainder of his brigade. The 1st Wisconsin was deployed as skirmishers to the left and right of the pike and moved out. Colonel Starkweather, at the head of the 79th Pennsylvania and two sections of Battery A, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery, followed closely behind the Wisconsin skirmishers.

Before these reinforcements could arrive, the 21st Wisconsin had collided head on with Wheeler's troopers. In the ensuing clash the Wisconsinites were badly worsted. Falling back they took cover near a log house on a hill north of the pike. From this commanding position the men

of the 21st Wisconsin were able to hold their own against the attacking Confederates.

Starkweather observing that his "flying column" had been unable to cut its way through to relieve the wagon train, called for Captain Jesse J. Craddock, of the 2d Kentucky Cavalry. Craddock was directed to take a detachment of about 50 of his men, detour to the south of the pike, and see if he could break through the Rebel cordon, which surrounded the isolated portions of the wagon train. However, the greyclads discovered the approach of Craddock's patrol in plenty of time, and easily repulsed it.

By this time Starkweather had reached the hill held by the 21st Wisconsin. The 1st Wisconsin took position on the 21st's right, while the 79th Pennsylvania was massed in rear of the former unit's left wing. The cannoneers manning the two sections of Battery A, 1st Kentucky Light Artillery, which had accompanied Starkweather when he moved out to repel the attack on the train, emplaced their four guns on the hill, and opened fire. This forced Wheeler to call for artillery support. Accordingly, the two guns of Wiggins' battery were brought up from the reserve, and the Arkansans returned the Yankees' fire.⁴

Wheeler satisfied that he would be unable to drive the Union infantry from their strong hold, and remembering his orders from Bragg to raise havoc with Rosecrans' supply lines, decided to suspend the attack and move on to greener pastures. Therefore two hours and ten minutes after the attack had commenced the Confederate officers re-assembled their men. 'Swinging into their saddles the Rebel command, having destroyed 20

heavily loaded wagons, and accompanied by some 50 unhappy prisoners, headed westward. Starkweather's brigade followed the butternuts for about one and one-half miles. However, the colonel, becoming apprehensive lest another force of Confederates attack his camp while he was absent, returned to his base.

Starkweather reported that in addition to the 20 wagons burned by the foe, his command had suffered the following casualties in the engagement: 1 killed, 8 wounded; 104 missing; and 9 prisoners. The Union officer reported that one of the eight Confederates captured by his command, had told him that 83 members of Wheeler's command had been slain in the fight. This figure was greatly exaggerated for while Wheeler made no report of his losses in the clash, he subsequently reported that the total casualties in his brigade, exclusive of the 1st Tennessee, for the entire campaign were 22 dead, 61 wounded, and 84 missing.⁵

Intelligence of Wheeler's attack on Starkweather's brigade caused Rosecrans to modify his master plan slightly. Immediately before the attack, orders had been drifted directing Starkweather to rendezvous with Rousseau's division. Rousseau's command was under orders to evacuate Stewartsboro and rejoin the Army of the Cumberland in front of Murfreesboro. A mounted force drawn from General Stanley's cavalry force would then assume responsibility for the protection of the Jefferson bridgehead. News of Wheeler's attack resulted in orders for Starkweather to remain at Jefferson for the time being.⁶

In an effort to intercept Wheeler's raiders before they could break

additional havoc on his supply lines, Rosecrans issued orders for General Stanley to proceed from Wilkinson's Cross-Roads to Lavergne. However, it was 11 p.m. before Stanley was able to muster two of his reserve cavalry regiments - the 15th Pennsylvania and 5th Tennessee, and start off in pursuit of Wheeler. Ten hours previously Colonel Kennett, in accordance with the orders received from Rosecrans' GHQ, had directed Colonel Minty to take the 4th Michigan and one battalion of the 7th Pennsylvania, and protect the Union supply trains moving along the Nashville pike. One battalion drawn from the 3d Kentucky and another from the 7th Pennsylvania would remain with the Union troops deployed on either side of the Nashville pike, following Minty's departure. These two units would man the straggler line which the Federal brass had established in the rear of their line of battle.⁷

Approximately midway between Stewarts Creek and Lavergne, Minty's command encountered a Rebel patrol of about 100 men, dressed in Federal uniforms. These butternuts had evidently become separated from Wheeler's command following the destruction of a wagon train. The troopers of the 7th Pennsylvania gave chase to the greyclads, while Minty pushed on toward Lavergne with his Michiganders. Two and one-half miles southeast of Lavergne, Minty fell in with General Walker's brigade. Walker informed Minty that he was too late to intercept the Rebels, for they had already passed beyond Lavergne. As it was beginning to get dark, Minty ordered his men to camp for the night. Shortly thereafter the Pennsylvanians returned, and informed Minty that they had been unable to overtake the

Confederates, clad in Yankee garb. Stanley's command in its sweep northward from Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, failed to establish contact with any of Wheeler's raiders. Reaching Minty's encampment early on the morning of the 31st, Stanley permitted his tired troopers to bivouac until morning.⁸

Following their successful attack on Starkweather's train, the Rebel raiders rode westward via the Jefferson pike, toward Lavergne. Wheeler's vanguard as it trotted along bagged two small Union detachments. The first was composed of "bummers" out stealing stock; the second a small well organized foraging party. Approaching Lavergne about 1 p.m.

Wheeler was advised by his scouts that the village was filled with blue-coats, and that a large train was parked in the fields surrounding the village. Preparatory to attacking Wheeler divided his command into three columns. These would converge upon the town from the southeast, north and northwest.

Once their unit commanders had given the order to charge! the butternuts dug their spurs into their horses' flanks and swept toward the town in columns of fours. The Yankees taken by surprise, surrendered after only a few shots had been exchanged. Wheeler's hard-riding troopers found themselves in possession of a very large wagon train loaded with ordnance, quartermaster and commissary supplies.⁹

The wagon train captured at Lavergne belonged to McCook's corps. It had left Nashville the previous evening. In addition to the escort, commanded by Captain Bradley, of General Davis' staff, a large number of

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casuals seeking to rejoin their units travelled with the train. Having gained possession of the town, Wheeler put his men to work paroling the prisoners, and destroying the immense train and stores. The train and its contents the general roughly calculated to be worth "many hundred thousands of dollars".¹⁰

Captain George K. Miller, of the 8th Confederate Cavalry, in a letter written subsequently to the raid described the scene in succinct terms: "The officers went quickly to work paroling the prisoners while the men burned the wagons. It was a sight to make all rebeldom glad. Mules, stampeding with burning wagons hung to their traces, Yankees running, all appliances for our subjugation".¹¹

In all Wheeler's command before its departure from Lavergne paroled about 500 prisoners, captured 200 stand of arms, and destroyed McCook's reserve wagon train. Subsequently a member of Crittenden's staff estimated that the greyclads in their raid on Lavergne had destroyed nearly a million dollars worth of public property.¹² Wheeler learning from his scouts that a strong force of Union infantry was approaching from the direction of Stewartsboro, ordered his men to remount. The butternuts then evacuated Lavergne moving southward toward Rock Spring.¹³

At the time that Wheeler's troopers descended upon Lavergne, Walker's Union infantry brigade was at Stewartsboro. In accordance with the orders received from Rosecrans' GHQ, the men of the brigade were busy getting eady to join the Army of the Cumberland in front of Murfreesboro. Just as the brigade was preparing to move out, a messenger galloped into camp.

This individual excitedly informed Walker "that a body of rebel cavalry, numbering from 1000 to 2000 men, had attacked and were burning the supply train belonging to General McCook's corps, at...[Lavergne]. Walker immediately issued instructions for the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio Regiments, supported by a section of the 4th Battery, Michigan Light Artillery, to hasten to the train's relief. Fearful that the Confederates might fall upon his camp during the "flying column's" absence, Walker garrisoned it with the 82d Indiana and two sections of the 4th Michigan Battery.¹⁴

Since Walker's "flying column" had to cover about four miles, the Rebels had destroyed nearly all the wagons and their contents before its arrival. Walker fearful that this would happen, made certain that the section of artillery moved at the head of his column. Scaling a hill about one-third of a mile southeast of Lavergne, Walker was cheered to note that a portion of Wheeler's command was still there. But the colonel was shocked to see the havoc which the Rebels had wreaked on McCook's train. The fields surrounding the town were jammed with burning wagons. Disarmed men and broken-down horses and mules were seen wandering aimlessly about the countryside.

Remembering his mission, Walker pulled his gaze away from the scene of destruction, and ordered the Michiganders to unlimber their guns. Lieutenant Edward S. Wheat's section then opened fire. At the time that the Union artillery went into action, detachments from Wheeler's command were endeavoring to roundup, and make off with the mules belonging to the captured train. The shelling quickly put a stop to this activity. For-

getting the mules, the butternuts scampered for cover in the woods flanking the road. In hopes of flushing the foe from the cedars, Walker observing that one of his regiments - the 31st Ohio - had arrived on the scene, ordered the unit forward. The infantrymen, screened by 20 troopers of the 1st Ohio Cavalry, moved forward - deployed as skirmishers. However, the Yankees quickly discovered it was futile to chase infantry with cavalry. They quickly gave up the pursuit after capturing five butternuts.

The 17th and 38th Ohio, now put in their appearance. These two units were detailed to police the area, which was littered with all the debris

a captured and looted army train. Two unburned wagons, many of the mules, a considerable quantity of the harness, along with a considerable amount of camp and garrison equipage, was secured by the Buckeyes. In searching the area, the blueclads found that the Rebels had broken into and rifled the trunks and valises belonging to the officers of McCook's corps. Apparently the Southerners had made off with the most of the clothing, and any other items which happened to excite their fancy.¹⁵

After they had policed and mopped up the area, Walker's troops were mustered and returned to their camp. On reaching Stewartsboro, Walker ordered the colonel of the 82d Indiana to undertake a forced march to Nashville. While enroute to Nashville, the Indianians were to collect and bring forward all the trains which they encountered moving to the
ont.

Reaching Nashville on the night of the 30th the regiment, after a

brief rest, retraced its steps. The 82d Indiana rejoined the brigade about 8 p.m. on the 31st in front of Murfreesboro.¹⁶

Entering Rock Spring, Wheeler's troopers surprised and captured another wagon train. After applying the torch to the wagons and paroling the prisoners, the column headed westward toward Nolensville. Encountering no Confederate oppositions the Rebels "dropped like a tornado upon quiet Nolensville". Here the butternuts discovered another large supply train, guarded by about 200 bluecoats. Taken by surprise, the Federals laid down their arms without offering any resistance. The Yankees were immediately paroled. Besides a large number of wagons loaded with ammunition and medicine, the Southerners found themselves in possession of several "fine ambulances". The torch was applied to the former, but the latter the Confederates took with them when they evacuated the village. Upon their departure from Nolensville, late on the afternoon of the 30th, Wheeler's column moved off in a westerly direction toward Franklin. As they jogged along, the greyclads encountered several Union foraging parties - their wagons loaded with "corn, bedclothing, poultry, house-furniture, eggs, butter, etc." The Unionists were eagerly relieved of their plunder, their wagons burned, and they, as prisoners of war, were mounted bareback on mules. Wheeler's command bivouacked for the night about five miles southwest of Nolensville.¹⁷

Before daybreak on the 31st Wheeler again had his men in the saddle. Detouring around Triune, Wheeler's column gained the Bole Jack road. As the Southerners pushed eastward, the sounds indicating that a great battle

was in progress near Murfreesboro grew steadily louder.

By the time that Wheeler's command had reached Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, where contact was established with Wharton's outposts, the two divisions of the Union right wing were in wild retreat toward the Nashville pike. In a little more than 36 hours, Wheeler had completed his circuit of the Army of the Cumberland's rear. Several large supply trains had been destroyed, thus greatly compounding Rosecrans' logistical problems. Furthermore the two crack infantry brigades commanded by Walker and Starkweather - which had been alerted to join Rosecrans in front of Murfreesboro on the 30th had been detained by Wheeler's activities. Therefore these two hard-fighting units would not be present on the field of battle on the 31st, when the Rebel launched their all out attack on the Union right flank.

On the 30th McCook's corps crossed Overall Creek, driving in the Confederate outposts. By dusk McCook's command had succeeded in establishing itself within close proximity of Bragg's main line of resistance. Zahm's cavalry brigade, reinforced by the 2d Tennessee, covered the right flank of McCook's corps. The troopers' mission was to ward off the forays of Wharton's cavalry, as the infantry pushed forward. Leaving their camp ground near the brick church, Zahm's troopers moved down Begsley Lane toward the Franklin road. Immediately after turning into the Franklin road, the blueclads encountered Wharton's pickets, guarding the bridge across Overall Creek. Once the Rebels had been driven in, Zahm halted his command. A combat patrol drawn from the 4th Ohio was sent by the colonel to reconnoiter the road that flanked the left bank of Overall Creek.

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Zahm had been told by the residents of the area that the road led to Salem. Before the patrol had proceeded very far, a strong detachment of Wharton's cavalry was encountered. A brisk clash ensued. Learning of this, Zahm reinforced the patrol. After about one hour of desultory skirmishing, Zahm was informed by his scouts, that Wharton was in the process of reinforcing his outpost with both cavalry and artillery.¹⁸

In the meantime Zahm had advanced a strong patrol up the Franklin road toward Murfreesboro. This detachment soon returned with the information that there was a powerful force of Confederates (McCown's division) encamped south of the Franklin road, and east of where Zahm's brigade had halted. Since his command had entered a heavily wooded area, Zahm felt it would be most unwise to engage Wharton at this time. The Federals then retired to where they had camped the previous evening.

Adjacent to the Begsley Lane church, there were a number of large open fields, well adapted for cavalry movements. Here Zahm formed his brigade into line of battle. Wharton's greyclads soon emerged from the woods south of the church. The Union and Confederate skirmishers were soon briskly engaged. Wharton shifted his command from left to right several times in an effort to turn Zahm's flanks. Everytime the butter-nuts made a feint, in search of an opening, Zahm successfully countered it. Frustrated in their efforts to outflank the Yankees, the Southerners retired in the direction of Salem. Once the foe had withdrawn, Zahm re-embled his command, preparatory to rejoining McCook.¹⁹

Before Wharton's withdrawal, General Stanley had received a message

from Zahm. On persuing the message the general learned that his subordinate was being pressed by a superior force. Stanley, having only two cavalry regiments (the 15th Pennsylvania and 5th Tennessee) available with which to reinforce Zahm, asked McCook for help. McCook issued instructions for Baldwin's brigade, of Johnson's division, to report to Stanley. Baldwin's brigade had left Triune shortly after daybreak. Moving rapidly eastward via the Bole Jack road and Wilkinson pike, the unit had only recently crossed Overall Creek. When McCook's order, directing the brigade to accompany General Stanley arrived during the mid-afternoon, the men of Baldwin's command were resting in the woods, which lay to the south of the Wilkinson pike.²⁰

Led by General Stanley, Baldwin's infantry, accompanied by the 5th Indiana Battery, moved out of the woods and into the open fields lying to the north of the Franklin road. At the Franklin road, Stanley was joined by Zahm's brigade. Stanley then ordered Baldwin to hold his brigade near the Franklin road, while he made a forced reconnaissance toward the Salem pike with the cavalry. One of Baldwin's regiments - the 93d Ohio - would accompany the cavalry. Company A, of the 93d Ohio was deployed as skirmishers, and thrown forward to cover Stanley's advance.

Before they had proceeded very far, the bluecoats encountered a few of Wharton's scouts. Following a brief clash the butternuts retreated. The Federals then resumed their advance, moving through several cotton and cornfields, and a large meadow. After his column had covered about one and one-half miles Stanley halted the command while it was formed

into line of battle - the infantry in the center the cavalry on the flanks. Resuming the advance the bluecoats pushed forward another half mile. Here their advance was brought up short upon encountering Wharton's powerful brigade, massed in line of battle. The infantry taking cover behind a worm fence opened fire on the Confederates. But, they quickly discovered that the range was too great, for their powder which had been dampened by the recent rains. Stanley after remarking "that we were not ready yet to fight the whole of Hardee's army corps", ordered his men to fall back. The Federals then retired to the Franklin road, Zahm's cavalry covering this movement. As darkness was rapidly approaching Wharton made no effort to pursue. Upon reaching the Franklin road, Zahm's troopers returned to their camp adjacent to the church. Baldwin's brigade camped for the night in the woods south of Wilkinson pike, where they had left their excess gear before participating in the forced reconnaissance.²¹

On the 30th while Wheeler's brigade was raiding Rosecrans' supply line, and Wharton's was threatening McCook's right flank, the two other Confederate cavalry brigades operating in the Murfreesboro area took it relatively east. Pegram's command, in addition to covering the approaches to Breckinridge's main line of resistance north of Murfreesboro, picketed the various fords across Stones River below the town. Buford's brigade remained at Rover throughout the day. About midnight Buford received orders from Bragg, to have his brigade ready to move for Murfreesboro at daybreak, on the 31st.²²

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Shortly after daybreak on the 31st Bragg launched his all out assault on the Army of the Cumberland's right flank. General Hardee's powerful and combat-wise corps spearheaded the thrust. Before the attack, Bragg had issued instructions for Wharton to report to Hardee. The able Hardee informed Wharton that at daybreak his wing would fall upon the foe. While the infantry and artillery was assailing the bluecoats in front, Wharton's cavalry would detour around their right, and fall upon "their flank and rear".

For ease of handling, Wharton divided the 1950 rank and file constituting his brigade into three combat teams. Colonel Thomas Harrison would be in charge of the one composed of the 2d Georgia, 3d Confederate, and 8th Texas Cavalry Regiments. Colonel John T. Cox's team consisted of the 1st Confederate, 14th Alabama Cavalry Battalion, Murray's Tennessee Cavalry Regiment, and Davis' Tennessee Cavalry Battalion. The 3d and 4th Tennessee, the 12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, detachment 3d Georgia Cavalry, and White's Tennessee Battery would constitute the reserve, and receive their orders directly from the general.²³

Before daybreak Wharton's troopers had quietly slipped into position, approximately midway between the Salem pike and the Franklin road. Realizing that Willich's picket line extended to a point some 600 yards south of the Franklin road, silence was the watch word as Wharton's eager men waited for Hardee's infantry to move forward. Suddenly all hell broke loose as McCown's division, closely supported by Cleburne's fell upon McCook's right flank. Within a matter of minutes Willich's and Kirk's

brigades had been scattered by the attacking Rebel infantry. These two shattered brigades, minus their commanders (Willich had been captured and Kirk wounded) retired rapidly in a northwesterly direction toward the Wilkinson pike. Four Confederate infantry brigades (Rains', Ector's McNair's, and Liddell's) followed closely on the fleeing blueclads' heels. In hopes of staying the route, Baldwin formed his brigade in the field south of the woods, in which his command had bivouacked for the night. Colonel Joseph B. Dodge, who had assumed charge of Kirk's shattered brigade, succeeded in reforming part of his unit on Baldwin's right. The Union brass hoped that this hastily formed line, would check the butters' terrible onslaught.

So overpowering was the attack of Hardee's corps that Wharton's troopers, as they trotted forward, were unable to keep pace. Wharton observing this, ordered his men to apply their spurs. Galloping forward the troops forded Puckett Creek, and soon drew abreast of the brigade, commanded by Brigadier General James E. Rains - the extreme left flank unit in Hardee's line of battle. Forging ahead of the hard-driving infantry Wharton's troopers, after advancing two and one-half miles, discovered their way barred by a Union cavalry brigade deployed in line of battle.²⁴

Daybreak on the 31st found Colonel Zahm's brigade drawn up in line of battle astride Overall Creek, in rear of the Begsley Lane church. A 'rol drawn from the 1st Ohio, was sent out by the colonel to reconnoiter to the left and front. Shortly thereafter, the sound of heavy firing to

the southeast became distinctly audible. Within a few minutes, Zahm's troopers were greatly disconcerted when they sighted "our infantry scattered all over the fields, running toward" them. Information soon reached the cavalrymen, indicating that Johnson's division had been routed by a powerful Confederate attack. Moments later Zahm's pickets became engaged with Rains' skirmishers.

The buttermuts easily drove in the Union outposts. From the officer in charge of the vedettes, Zahm learned that a powerful line of battle, composed of infantry was rapidly bearing down upon him. Shortly thereafter the grim line hove into view. Simultaneously Zahm caught sight of Wharton's long columns moving toward his left. It was apparent to the colonel that the Rebel cavalry planned to flank him. A messenger was sent galloping to the front to recall the reconnaissance patrol. Falling back, the patrol as it moved northward along the left bank of Puckett Creek, passed within 150 yards of the left flank of Rains' battle line. Following the departure of the orderly, and before the patrol's return, Zahm decided that if he was to save his command he would have to retire. Covered by a strong rear guard the troopers, moving in column of fours, fell back about a mile. Zahm then formed the 1st and 3d Ohio into line of battle in a cornfield, lying to the South of the Wilkinson Pike and east of Overall Creek. Here the reconnaissance patrol rejoined the brigade.²⁵

The Buckeyes easily beat off Wharton's initial thrust, which could be best described as a reconnaissance in force. Wharton then ordered

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White's battery into action. One of the first shells from the Confederate cannon mortally wounded Major David A. B. Moore, of the 1st Ohio. Being without any artillery support, at the moment, the Federals retired. The bluecoats, with Wharton's troopers in hot pursuit, retired across the cornfield in the direction of the Wilkinson pike. Near the pike, Zahm rallied his brigade. Here the Yankee cavalymen, making good use of their carbines, succeeded in turning back Wharton's hard-charging troopers three times, before they were forced to give ground. In hopes that they would be able to prolong their delaying action until reinforcements arrived, the Northern troopers took up positions covering the Wilkinson pike.²⁶

As they had pressed forward, pushing Zahm's bluecoats before them, Wharton's determined troopers had captured and sent to the rear, under escort, a large number of troops from Johnson's routed division. Approaching the Wilkinson pike, the butternuts were able to observe that Zahm's cavalymen had been augmented by both infantry and artillery. This could be a dangerous situation. Wharton fully realizing the necessity of preventing the foe from organizing a new line of battle - ordered White's battery to unlimber. Colonel Cox was directed to mass "his command for a charge". The infantry and artillery sighted by Wharton were the shattered fragments of several commands routed earlier by Hardee's attack, then in the process of being reorganized by their officers. Colonel William H. Gibson, who had assumed command of Willich's brigade, was seeking to rally a force from his unit, to cover the escape of McCook's ammunition

train, In support of this force Gibson had seen that the cannoneers of Battery A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery had emplaced one of their guns near the pike.²⁷

At this time the Confederate attack had continued to roll forward, scoring big gains. Polk's corps had moved to the attack. A second Union division - commanded by Davis - had been crumpled, and Baldwin's brigade routed. Two regiments from the former officer's division - the 74th and 75th Illinois - had fallen back in confusion. The officers of these two units, sought to reform their regiments on Gibson's left.²⁸

It was against this rather formidable, but disorganized and discouraged force, that Wharton sent Cox. With wild yells Cox's command, accompanied by a detachment of the 8th Texas, swept forward. The Yankees were quickly overwhelmed by the Southern horsemen. The Ohioans' gun falling prey to the Texans. So dismal was the outlook that Colonel Gibson, in answer to a demand to surrender, prepared to hand over his sword. But a vigorous counter attack, sparked by Zahm's cavalry threw the greyclads into momentary confusion. Taking advantage of this situation, Gibson and most of his men made good their escape. Not so fortunate was a detachment of the 75th Illinois, which was surrounded and captured by Cox's command.²⁹

Having rescued Colonel Gibson and a portion of his command, Zahm's troopers fell back across the open field which bounded the Wilkinson pike on the north. The cavalry then passed through a strip of woods, emerging into a large cornfield lying to the southeast of Asbury church. Throughout

this retreat, the cavalymen were continually harassed by the fire of White's battery. In pulling back, Zahm's troops had a close shave when they passed within 200 yards of Rains' brigade. However, Rains' unit, which was moving along in column, was under orders from McCown to move to the northeast to reinforce the Confederates, then attacking the Union infantry southwest of Round Forest. Determined to carry out their mission the infantrymen ignored the cavalry. Zahm's withdrawal was also harassed on the left, by combat patrols from Wharton's brigade. These units pushed rapidly up the valley of Overall Creek, in an effort to reach the blue-coats' rear, and cut off their retreat.³⁰

Immediately after his brigade had reached the cornfield, one of McCook's aides approached Zahm. The staff officer told Zahm, that the corps' ammunition train was retiring along the road flanking the right bank of Overall Creek, and that it must be saved at all hazards. Accordingly Zahm formed his brigade to protect the train. From left to right Zahm's brigade was deployed as follows: 3d Ohio, 1st Ohio, 2d Tennessee and 4th Ohio.

Wharton, as he led his brigade forward, sighted McCook's ammunition train, guarded by Zahm's troops, withdrawing toward the Nashville pike. By the time that the greyclads had crossed the Asbury pike, the head of the train had reached the Nashville pike. Wharton noted that the Union cavalry had been reinforced, for now two commands instead of one stood between him and the train. Preparatory to attacking Wharton saw that White's guns were unlimbered. Colonel Henry M. Ashby with the 2d Tennessee and 12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion took position to the front,

while Harrison massed his combat team to the right.³¹

The morning of the 31st found six companies of the 4th U. S. Cavalry camped in rear of General Rosecrans' GHQ. About 7:30 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Julius P. Garesché, Rosecrans' chief of staff, told the commanding officer of the 4th - Captain Elmer Otis, that the Rebel cavalry was endeavoring to turn the Union right. Otis was directed to take his force and investigate this threat. Crossing the Nashville pike, Otis formed his command into line of battle: Each company in column of fours, led by the company commander. As the regiment moved forward, Otis was able to ascertain that the Army of the Cumberland's right flank had given away. From several of Davis' men the captain was able to learn the whereabouts of Wharton's butternuts. After moving to their right for about a quarter-mile, the regulars debouched from the woods into an open field. Two bodies of troops were immediately sighted by the regulars - off to their right front was Zahm's brigade, while emerging from the woods on the opposite side of the field was Wharton's command.³²

Once Wharton had given the word, White's battery opened fire on the Union cavalry with "considerable effect". When informed that his men were ready to charge, the general ordered White's cannoneers to cease firing. The troopers then surged forward - Ashby's Tennesseans engaging the regulars, while Harrison's combat team, spearheaded by the 8th Texas, moved against Zahm's brigade.

The regulars did not wait to receive the Tennesseans' attack, but charged out to meet it. In the ensuing melee the regulars vanquished the

Tennesseans, capturing about 100 of them. Otis then reformed his brigade, preparatory to moving against White's two guns, which were guarded by about 125 butternuts.

Even before Harrison's combat team had closed with Zahm's brigade one of the latter officer's regiments - the 2d Tennessee, had bolted for the rear. The 1st and 4th Ohio and one battalion of the 3d Ohio likewise gave way before Harrison's onslaught. Only one of Zahm's units - the 2d battalion, 3d Ohio Cavalry - held firm. One of McCook's staff officers galloped up and told the battalion commander, Major James W. Paramore, he would have to hold on for a little longer if the ammunition train's safety was to be insured. Grudgingly yielding ground, the Buckeyes retired toward the Nashville pike. Otis realizing that if his attack on White's battery was to succeed, he would have to have more men, rode to the right and asked Major Paramore for help. The major refused stating "that he was placed there to protect a train, and would not change with me [Otis]" 33

Zahm succeeded in rallying most of his Ohioans after they had fallen back about 400 yards. Wharton desirous of exploiting the gains already made by his force, decided to by-pass the regulars and Paramore's battalion in an effort to cut his way through to the Nashville pike. His entire brigade, except for White's battery and the 4th Tennessee and 12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, would be hurled against Zahm's badly battered command. At a word from the general, the Rebel troopers (almost 1500 strong) thundered forward. The gentle rolling open terrain in this sector of the battle-

field was very suitable for cavalry operations. After a brief hand-to-hand clash, in which the revolver was used with deadly effect, Zahm's troopers fled. In his report of the battle Zahm wrote:

At this juncture the 1st and 4th [Ohio] retired pretty fast, the enemy in close pursuit after them, the 2d East Tennessee having the lead of them all. Matters looked pretty blue now;...I was with the three regiments that skedaddled, and among the last to leave the field. Tried hard to rally them, but the panic was so great that I could not do it. I could not get the command together again until I arrived at the north side of the [Overall] creek;...³⁴

The 9th Michigan Infantry, attached to Thomas' corps as provost guards, had camped on the night of the 30th near the bridge which carried the Nashville pike across Overall Creek. Some two hours after the battle had commenced, the Michiganders had sighted the first stragglers from McCook's corps making their way to the rear. Patrols were sent out by the 9th Michigan's tough commander - Lieutenant Colonel John G. Parkhurst - to roundup the skulkers. Shortly thereafter, the colonel observed several cavalymen approaching very rapidly from the direction of the front. Within a few minutes a large force of cavalry, accompanied by infantry and a large wagon train hove into view. The men were seen to be throwing away their arms and accouterments, many of them having even lost their hats. When the Michiganders inquired as to what had caused the rout, the panic-stricken soldiers replied, "We are all lost". Parkhurst, in hopes of checking the stampede, formed his regiment astride the pike. Bayonets were fixed, and the troops alerted to be on the lookout for the enemy's cavalry. Without firing upon the frightened men, Parkhurst succeeded in

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checking many of them in their flight. Before one-half hour had elapsed, Parkhurst had collected about 1000 cavalry, seven pieces of artillery, and nearly two regiments of infantry. The infantry belonged to Johnson's division and the cavalry to Zahm's brigade.³⁵

From the information obtained from the refugees, Parkhurst was unable to ascertain either the strength or composition of the pursuing force. Consequently the colonel organized the force which he had collected and formed it into line of battle, on the crest of the ridge, overlooking Overall Creek.³⁶

While the pursuit of Zahm's shattered brigade was in progress, Wharton learned that Ashby's Tennesseans had been unable to hold their own against the regulars. Otis after failing to obtain Paramore's help had rejoined his command. The regulars were now formed, preparatory to moving against White's battery. Wharton realizing that it would not only be impossible, but foolish to recall his men, decided to give his personal attention to saving the battery. When the general, accompanied by two of his staff, rode up he found that in addition to the cannoneers, there were only some 20 men of the 4th Tennessee with the battery. Since Otis' regulars were only 400 yards away the battery's position was most desperate. Deploying the few men available, Wharton ordered the artillerymen to open fire on the bluecoats. Before very many shells had exploded in the ranks of his command, Otis received an order from Rosecrans directing him to retire to the Nashville pike. Reluctantly the captain suspended the order to attack, and the regulars, taking their prisoners with them, withdrew.³⁷

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While the general was saving the battery, his troopers had reached the Nashville pike. Here they fell upon and captured a large wagon train belonging to Thomas' corps (estimated to contain several hundred wagons), five guns and the caissons of the 5th Wisconsin Battery, and about 650 infantry. The butternuts acting under orders from Colonels Cox and Harrison, quickly started the booty and prisoners toward the Wilkinson pike. Believing that they had driven all the Union cavalry across Overall Creek, and apprehending danger alone from that quarter, the two colonels only covered the right flank and rear of their column with patrols as they headed southward.³⁸

Rosecrans upon learning of the disaster which had befallen McCook's corps had ordered Colonel Kennett "to collect all the cavalry at...his command, and proceed to rally the right wing and drive the enemy away". Leaving two battalions of the 7th Pennsylvania to continue to serve as vedettes and couriers Kennett, accompanied by two battalions of the 3d Kentucky, started for Wilkinson's Cross-Roads. Finding the roads jammed with refugees from the front, the Kentuckians moved slowly forward. Emerging from the woods, the Kentuckians sighted the Union train being escorted to the rear by Wharton's troops.

About this time Paramore's battalion had reached the Nashville pike at a point southeast of where the Rebels had bagged Thomas' train. The Buckeyes had succeeded in saving McCook's ammunition train, except for several wagons which had broken down and could not be moved. Learning that Colonel Eli H. Murray, of the 3d Kentucky, was about to attack in hopes of recovering Thomas' train, Major Paramore detached two companies

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to his support.

Since the Rebels did not expect a counterattack from the east, they had neglected to cover their left flank with patrols. Sweeping forward the bluecoats surprised the Confederates. Before Cox and Harrison were able to rally their men, the Yankees had recaptured the guns of the 5th Wisconsin battery, the wagons, and enabled some 250 of their comrades-in-arms to effect an escape. So unexpected and vigorous was the Union thrust, that the Rebels decided that the attacking force must be the regulars reinforced by Zahm's brigade. Wharton, upon arriving on the scene, decided it would be best to secure the prisoners and public property that remained in his command's possession before essaying new adventures. Disengaging Wharton's troopers, bringing their booty with them, rapidly retired in the direction of the Wilkinson pike. The greatly outnumbered Union cavalry, satisfied with their success, wisely made no effort to pursue.³⁹

It was now past noon and Rosecrans had succeeded in fashioning a new main line of resistance fronting the Nashville pike, with his refused left flank resting on Stones River. Hardee's attack while not stopped, had been materially slowed. During the afternoon, the Confederate brass were to throw in a fresh division - Breckinridge's. The former Vice-President's command would fritter away its strength in a series of piecemeal attacks directed against Round Forest, which covered the salient angle in Rosecrans' line.

Once the prisoners had been turned over to the provost marshal, and the captured public property over to the quartermaster and commissary officers, Wharton mustered in command in the fields adjacent to the Gresham

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house. Rolls were called, and Wharton found that during the morning's activities, his command had suffered about 150 casualties. "Boots and Saddles" was then sounded. The greyclads again mounted their horses, and headed for the front.⁴⁰

Colonel Walker's brigade, in accordance with the orders from Rosecrans received on the night of the 30th, left their camp at Stewartsboro at 7:30 a.m. While preparing to cross Stewarts Creek, Walker received a message from Rosecrans, "to take up a strong position and defend the trains at the creek". The 4th Michigan Battery was placed in position on a commanding hill east of the pike, the infantry being formed in line of battle in support. Hardly had Walker's men taken position, than they encountered a large number of fugitives, "fleeing to the rear, and spreading most exaggerated reports of disaster to the right wing of our army". Walker's grim soldiers put an abrupt stop to this flight. Men who had thrown away their guns were compelled to pick them up again and return to the field. Walker had not been in position at Stewarts Creek for very long, when orders arrived from Thomas, directing him to move to the front, where he would report to General Rousseau.⁴¹

Orders from army headquarters reached General Stanley, at Lavergne, at 9:30 a.m. ordering him to move to McCook's support. Accompanied by Minty's brigade and 15th Pennsylvania and 5th Tennessee, Stanley hit the road. A detachment of the 4th Michigan and Newell's section Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery were left to guard the junction of the Nashville and Jefferson pikes. Stanley reached Stewarts Creek, just as Walker's brigade was preparing to resume the advance. The cavalry officer told

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Walker that his troopers would screen the infantry's right flank. Walker after covering his front with a strong line of skirmishers, passed the word to move out. These skirmishers would serve a twofold purpose - besides helping to roundup the fugitives, they would give the brigade timely warnings, if the enemy should suddenly appear.⁴²

Approaching Overall Creek, Walker learned that but a short time before a strong Confederate mounted force (Wheeler's brigade) had threatened to cut the Union life line west of the creek. To guard against such a catastrophe, Walker deployed his brigade in the cornfield south of the pike. Since it was a cavalry attack which threatened, the colonel formed his troopers into squares, a section of artillery in the center of each.⁴³

When the reported butternuts failed to put in an appearance, Walker alerted his men to be ready to resume the advance. However, before the colonel could form his command on the road "another stampede of mules, negroes, fugitives, and cowards of every grade" was sighted. A member of General Thomas' staff galloped up, and asked Walker to check the panic stricken mob. The brigade was quickly formed into line of battle athwart the road. The sight of Walker's combat-ready brigade served "to reassure and give confidence to the runaways". Frightened men were calmed, rearmed, and escorted back to their units. Once the stampede had been checked, Walker mustered his brigade, and the many times interrupted march to the front resumed. Reaching Overall Creek, Walker was informed by Colonel Parkhurst, that the Rebel cavalry (Wharton's brigade) had returned and was again menacing the Nashville pike. After crossing the creek, Walker took position south of the pike. Parkhurst command continued to guard the

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western approaches, to the bridge spanning Overall Creek.⁴⁴

General Buford's small brigade, acting in accordance with instructions from Bragg, left Rover at daybreak. The brigade reached the battlefield about noon. Here Buford received orders to proceed to Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, where he would report to General Wheeler.

Upon reaching Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, Buford was informed by Wheeler, that their combined brigades would move northward, striking the Nashville pike west of Overall Creek. Simultaneously Wharton would be wreaking havoc on the Union trains, plying the pike east of the stream. With Buford's brigade in the van, the hard-riding Confederates moved northward toward their objective. As Buford's brigade neared the pike, the troopers sighted a strong force of the foe, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, guarding a large wagon train. The Union infantry - Parkhurst's command - was occupying a commanding position. Buford hastily deployed his brigade preparatory to attacking - the 3d Kentucky Cavalry on the right, the 6th Kentucky Cavalry on the left. One company of the 6th Kentucky was thrown forward as skirmishers.⁴⁵

The bluecoats were well aware of the butternuts' advance. While General Stanley's troopers moved forward to engage the foe, the guns of the 4th Michigan Battery, emplaced east of Overall Creek, raked the approaching Kentuckians with shot and shell. Fearful lest he had stirred up a hornet's nest, Wheeler ordered Buford to withdraw. Before receiving this order to retire, the Southerners had lost 1 killed and 3 wounded. In partial compensation some 30 stragglers from McCook's corps, had been

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captured and paroled by Buford's troopers before they had received the order to retreat. Following their repulse, the greyclads retired to Wilkinson's Cross-Road. Apparently satisfied with their local success, the Federals did not follow it up. ⁴⁶

The morning's activities had evidently sapped the combat effectiveness of Wharton's brigade. For the brigade's early afternoon thrust toward the pike, made in conjunction with Wheeler's attack, was most lethargic. Wharton's feeble stabs were easily parried by Kennett's troopers, reinforced by Zahm's reorganized brigade. The latter officer's unit after regrouping, had again crossed to the east side of Overall Creek. Frustrated in their half-hearted efforts to reach the Nashville pike, Wharton's troopers retired to the Wilkinson pike. ⁴⁷

Wheeler's thrust having been turned back, Stanley's troopers crossed Overall Creek. Moving southward from the pike, along the lane flanking the right bank of Overall Creek, the troopers drove a number of stragglers from Wharton's brigade before them. Upon reaching a point three-quarters of a mile south of the pike, Colonel Minty dismounted and deployed the troopers of the 4th Michigan as skirmishers. The Michiganders took position in the edge of the wooded area adjacent to Asbury church. A detachment drawn from the 5th Tennessee, also dismounted, was placed in support of the men of the 4th Michigan. Captain William H. Jennings' battalion, 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, reinforced by the two companies 3d Kentucky Cavalry, was posted in the woods to the Michiganders' right and rear. The 15th Pennsylvania was massed in the rear of Jennings' command. All told

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the Federals had approximately 950 troopers concentrated in the woods adjacent to Asbury church.⁴⁸

Wharton's attack having failed to materialize, Walker again assembled his brigade on the pike. Taking up the march, the brigade moved forward a little over a mile before again halting. The unit had stopped this time in front of Rosecrans' GHQ. Here Walker received orders to report to General McCook. In accordance with instructions from McCook, Walker placed his men in position, guarding the point where Asbury pike joined the Nashville pike.⁴⁹

Wheeler, fearful that Stanley's advance toward Asbury church, presaged an attempt to turn the Confederate left, determined to beat the bluecoats to the punch. He proposed to attack first. Evacuating Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, the greyclads followed the pike eastward. Upon reaching Overall Creek, Wheeler divided his command. Buford's brigade would push northward along the left bank of the creek, while Wheeler's unit advanced on the opposite side. The two generals, before beginning the forward movement, deployed their respective commands. A strong force of dismounted skirmishers would cover the advance. At a prearranged signal from Wheeler, the two brigades moved off.⁵⁰

It was almost 4 p.m. before the Confederate vanguard reached the vicinity of Asbury church. Sighting the long line of skirmishers, General Stanley feared that he was about to be attacked by infantry. Within a few minutes, the remainder of Wheeler's brigade hove into view, and Stanley was cheered to observe that they were mounted. The general felt

that his command would be better able to cope with a cavalry unit.

Pressing eagerly forward the greyclads forced the 4th Michigan to fall back on the 5th Tennessee. Grimly, bracing themselves the men of these two regiments, succeeded in momentarily checking Wheeler's advance.. In the meantime Buford had arrived on the scene. The Kentuckians discovering that there was only a few scattered Union patrols operating on the west bank of Overall Creek, prepared to launch a powerful attack on the Union right. Spearheaded by the 6th Kentucky, Buford's brigade charged across the stream. Buford's attack fell upon Jennings' Pennsylvanians and the Kentuckians. Observing that the 4th Michigan and 5th Tennessee were apparently holding their own, Colonel Minty decided to use men from these two units to shore up Jennings' line. However, while Minty was endeavoring to bolster his right - the 15th Pennsylvania gave way. With his right flank laid bare, Stanley realized it would be suicidal to have his troopers remain where they were. Accordingly the order to retreat was issued. The horse-holders brought forward the troopers' mounts. Swinging into their saddles the blueclads fell back rapidly in the direction of the Nashville pike. To escape the shells of the section of the Bufala battery, which had now gone into action, the Yankees regrouped behind the topographic crest of a ridge adjacent to the pike.⁵¹

Since they were approaching an area strongly held by Union infantry, Wheeler's and Buford's troopers cautiously followed the retreating Yankees. In the open field in front of the ridge behind which Stanley was marshaling his bluecoats, Wheeler reformed his command. A double line of

Confederate horsemen took position immediately in front of the ridge, while a strong force sought to turn the Federals' left.

However, Stanley decided to beat the butternuts to the punch. Giving the order to charge, the general galloped forward, followed by two companies of the 4th Michigan and some 50 men of the 15th Pennsylvania. Jennings' battalion, of the 7th Pennsylvania, ably supported Stanley's thrust. Taken by surprise the Southern column, which had been assigned the mission of turning the Union left, quickly gave way. Inspired by the general, Minty led the remainder of the 4th Michigan and 15th Pennsylvania, and 5th Tennessee against the Confederate force massed to his immediate front. The initial Rebel line quickly gave way. Minty's troopers then closed with the second, from which they were separated by a lane. A brief clash ensued, from which the Yankees emerged victorious.⁵²

Dusk was approaching, and the Union cavalry glad to close this unhappy day on a cheerful note, bivouacked for the night in the fields north of Asbury church. A line of outposts, manned by detachments from the 5th Tennessee, 4th Michigan, and 15th Tennessee, patrolled Asbury pike.

Wheeler's and Buford's brigade camped for the night in the fields north of Wilkinson pike. Upon Wheeler's retirement, Wharton's brigade again moved forward, taking position on Liddell's left. To insure against surprise, and provide for the security of the army's left flank, Wharton's troopers established and manned a strong picket line in the fields immediately to the south of Asbury pike.⁵³

Rosecrans, having learned that Wheeler's troopers had routed the

Union cavalry from the area adjacent to Asbury church, determined to bolster his mounted arm with infantry. Two infantry brigades, both badly mauled in the morning's fighting, would be rushed to the hard-pressed cavalry's support. Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade, of Sheridan's division, and the brigade of Negley's division, led by Colonel Timothy Stanley, were soon tramping northwestward along the Nashville pike. By the time the two infantry brigades had reached the bridge across Overall Creek, the Union cavalry had turned back Wheeler's and Buford's butter-nuts. Greusel formed his brigade west of the creek, in support of the 5th Wisconsin Battery. Three companies of the 24th Wisconsin were thrown forward to reinforce the picket line, which the cavalry had established. Stanley's brigade was deployed east of the stream. In the event that the Rebels should launch a surprise attack during the night, the men of Greusel's and Stanley's brigade slept upon their arms.⁵⁴

While three of the cavalry brigades then operating with Bragg's army had been very active on the 31st, the fourth - Pegram's had spent a relatively quiet day. The mission assigned to Pegram by the Rebel brass, determined the brigade's course of action. Patrols drawn from Pegram's unit, were to keep the various crossings of Stones River below Murfreesboro under constant observation.

During the morning, Pegram's scouts had discovered Van Cleve's division crossing Stones River at McFadden's Ford. News of this development was immediately forwarded to General Breckinridge. A combat patrol drawn from Colonel Joseph B. Palmer's brigade, led by Captain D.H.C. Spence,

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was thrown forward to support the cavalry. Evidently Pegram's troopers were not very vigorous in their scouting and patrolling. For Rosecrans, upon learning of the disaster which had overtaken McCook, ordered Van Cleve's division recalled. Pegram overly cautious troopers failed to pick up this movement, until too late.

At 10:10 a.m. long after Van Cleve's division had recrossed the river, Breckinridge received a message from General Bragg directing him to reinforce Hardee. Breckinridge, not knowing that the Federals had withdrawn, and basing his plans on the latest information from Pegram, which indicated that the foe was moving toward him, determined to hold Bragg's order in abeyance. A staff officer was sent to acquaint Bragg with the situation. Bragg then issued instructions for Breckinridge not to await attack, but to advance and meet it. Accordingly Breckinridge's powerful line of battle moved forward, ready to engage the supposedly oncoming foe. After advancing about one-half mile, it became all too apparent to the greyclads that the Federals had recrossed the river. Breckinridge then suspended his advance. Two brigades - Jackson's and Adams' - were ordered to cross the river, and support Polk's attacks on Round Forest. Thanks to the lack of initiative displayed by Pegram's troopers, afternoon had arrived before Breckinridge's hard-fighting men joined their comrades-in-arms on the west side of Stones River. By this time the Federals had stabilized their newly established main line of resistance, and Bragg's chance for scoring a smashing victory had evaporated.⁵⁵

Shortly after the noon hour, a large Union foraging party crossed Stones River at McFadden's Ford. Pegram's troopers, reinforced by Spence's combat patrol, moved forward to attack the foragers. Sighting the approaching Rebels, the foraging party retired rapidly toward the ford.

One of Van Cleve's brigades-commanded by Colonel Samuel W. Price - had been detailed to guard the ford. The other two brigades having been sent to succor the Union right. Price advised that a strong force of greyclads were bearing down on the foragers, ordered the 3d Wisconsin battery into action. The artillery's fire served to check, for a moment, the Rebel's ardor.

But, the Southerners recovered their poise in time to make off with 18 wagons and 170 prisoners. Fearing that this raid presaged an attempt by the enemy to force a crossing at McFadden's Ford, Price threw forward the 8th Kentucky. The Kentuckians, deployed as skirmishers, took up positions covering the ford. However, the Confederates were fully committed elsewhere. And the attack on the foraging party, Price's fears to the contrary, was just a small scale raid. But the Union brass didn't know this. Several regiments were therefore pulled out of the Round Forest contest, and rushed to Price's support. Following their successful attack on the foraging party, Pegram's troopers and Spence's combat patrol returned to their camps, adjacent to the Lebanon pike.

arkness soon descended and the day's hostilities east of the river were terminated.⁵⁶

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Notes

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

Chapter II

WHEELER'S DECEMBER 30th RAID, AND CAVALRY ACTIVITIES ON THE FIRST DAY
OF THE BATTLE

- 1 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 664, 958, 963; Dyer "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 81.
- 2 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 958, 960, 963, 965. The other section of Wiggins' battery had been left at Murfreesboro, before the raiders' departure.
- 3 Ibid., 391.
- 4 Ibid., 391-392, 958, 960, 965.
- 5 Ibid., 392, 958, 960.
- 6 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 276, 279. Starkweather's brigade remained at Jefferson until the next day, when it was again ordered to rejoin the Army of the Cumberland. However, the brigade did not reach the field of battle until 5 p.m., after the day's fighting had closed.
- 7 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 618, 623-624.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid., Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 82-83; G. C. Kniffin, "The Battle of Stone's River, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, (New York, 1884), 614.
- 10 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 275; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 959-960.

11 Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 83.

12 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 959-960; Kniffin, "The Battle of Stone's River, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, 614.

13 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 959-960. It is difficult to arrive at the exact number of wagons destroyed at Lavergne by Wheeler's troopers. Lieutenant Colonel James D. Webb, of the 51st Alabama Cavalry, reports that his unit captured 36 wagons laden with ammunition, commissary, and quartermaster stores. Captain Miller in his letter states that the Rebels captured 300 heavily loaded wagons. Wheeler made no report of the number of wagons destroyed at Lavergne. Lieutenant Colonel John W. Taylor, the Army of the Cumberland's chief quartermaster, in his enumeration of public annals and transportation lost by the army in the period between December 26, 1862 and January 16, 1863, listed McCook's losses as 150 wagons and 22 ambulances. Since it was McCook's reserve train which Wheeler bagged his figure is too large. If we should deduct the ambulances and the wagons lost by individual units, it reduces the vehicles lost by McCook's corps during the Stones River campaign to 103. It is probably that all or most of these wagons belonging to Davis' and Sheridan's supply trains and corps headquarters were destroyed by Wheeler at Lavergne. In addition it is quite likely that a number of wagons belonging to sutlers were travelling with the train, at the time that it was attacked and were also destroyed. O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 226-227.

14 Ibid., 441

- 15 Ibid.; Kniffin, "The Battle of Stone's River", Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, 614.
- 16 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 441-442.
- 17 Ibid., 959-960, 964; Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 83. It is impossible to list the exact number of wagons burned by Wheeler at Rock Spring and Nolensville. Neither Wheeler or the Federals made a report of the number of wagons destroyed at these points. Captain Miller in a letter subsequent to the event wrote, that the butternuts captured "some 150 wagons" at Nolensville. Colonel Webb in his official report of the attack on Nolensville stated: "After which they [the troopers of the 51st Alabama] proceeded to Nolensville, and, with other commands of this brigade, captured 20 wagons, 50 prisoners, the teams of horses and mules, late in the afternoon of that day [December 30]".
- 18 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 635-636.
- 19 Ibid., 636; O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 469.
- 20 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 254, 337, 345.
- 21 Ibid., 337, 339, 341, 343, 345, 636, 640.
- 22 Ibid., 970.
- 23 Ibid., 966.
- 24 Ibid.,
- 25 Ibid., 636, 640, 641.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid., 306, 966.
- 28 Ibid., 271.

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- 29 Ibid., 271, 306, 636, 966.
- 30 Ibid., 636-638, 913, 939.
- 31 Ibid., 637, 641, 643, 966: Map of the Battlefield of Stones River,
Survey under the direction of Capt. M. Michler (National Archives,
Washington).
- 32 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 648-649.
- 33 Ibid., 637, 640, 646, 649, 967.
- 34 Ibid., 637, 967.
- 35 Ibid., 652.
- 36 Ibid., 652-653.
- 37 Ibid., 649, 967.
- 38 Ibid., 967.
- 39 Ibid., 621, 627-628, 641-642, 652, 967-968. Wharton's brigade as
it withdrew within the Confederate lines, brought along as spoils of
war, 5 or 6 pieces of artillery, about 400 prisoners, 328 head of beef,
cattle, and a number of mules cut from the wagons.
- 40 Ibid., 968.
- 41 Ibid., 442.
- 42 Ibid., 442, 618, 624.
- 43 Ibid., 442.
- 44 Ibid., 442, 653.
- 45 Ibid., 959-960, 970.
- 46 Ibid., 653, 959-960, 970.
- 47 Ibid., 637, 653, 968.
- 48 Ibid., 624.

49 Ibid., 442.

50 Ibid., 959-960, 971.

51 Ibid., 618, 624, 959-960, 971.

52 Ibid., 618, 624-625, 959-960, 964, 971.

53 Ibid., 618, 625, 960, 968, 971.

54 Ibid., 357, 359, 408. One of Greusel's regiments - the 36th Illinois - was temporarily attached to Laiboldt's brigade, and didn't accompany its parent unit to Overall Creek.

55 Ibid., 665-666, 782-783, 789.

56 Ibid., 607-608, 804. Price had posted his brigade on the crest of the ridge overlooking McFadden's ford. The unit was massed in double line battle. From right to left the initial line consisted of the 8th Kentucky, 3d Wisconsin Battery, 51st Ohio, and 35th Indiana. The second line had the 21st Kentucky on the right and the 99th Ohio on the left.

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

CHAPTER III - Cavalry Operations -- January 1-5

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April 1959

. CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

. Chapter III

. CAVALRY OPERATIONS - JANUARY 1-5

The opposing armies utilized the hours of darkness to fortify and strengthen their respective positions. Many of the Confederate officers felt that daybreak on the 1st would find them in possession of the field, and the Army of the Cumberland in full retreat toward Nashville. At dawn patrols were sent forward to reconnoiter the bluecoats' position. These soon returned with the information that the Federal army was still massed to the Rebels' immediate front. Bragg, in hopes that his cavalry would be able to break Rosecrans' supply line forcing him to retire, sent for General Wheeler. The cavalry chieftan was directed to proceed with three brigades (his own, Wharton's and Buford's) to the enemy's "rear, to cut off his trains and develop any movement".¹

Once the unit commanders had mustered their troopers, Wheeler's formidable striking force, rode westward along the Wilkinson pike. Turning northward at Wilkinson's Cross-Roads, the Rebel raiders moved to strike the Nashville pike at Stewarts Creek.

On the 1st, as on the previous day, the Stewarts Creek bridge was guarded by the 10th Ohio Infantry, commanded by hard-boiled Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Burke. Immediately before the Confederates' put in their appearance, the Buckeyes had been joined by the detachment of the

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4th Michigan Cavalry and Newell's section, Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery. These two units had been garrisoning the junction of the Nashville and Jefferson pikes. Warned by his scouts that a strong force of Rebels was approaching, Burke ordered the "long roll" sounded.

After his men had made several half-hearted thrusts against Burke's fully-manned line of outposts, Wheeler decided it would be wiser, and less costly, to look elsewhere for less alert game. Recalling his vanguard, Wheeler decided to strike for Lavergne. Utilizing seldom frequented lanes lying to the south, and out of sight of the Nashville pike, the butternuts pushed rapidly on toward their next objective. Burke divining the Southerners' intentions, sent a staff officer to warn the command of the Lavergne garrison, Colonel William P. Innes, to be on guard.²

Long before daybreak on the 1st, the Federals had commenced to organize hospital trains, for the purpose of evacuating the thousands of wounded to hospitals in Nashville. At 4 a.m. a large train guarded by the 9th Michigan Infantry started for Nashville. Five hours later, a second convoy consisting of ambulances and ammunition wagons started for the rear. This train made up of between 200 and 300 wagons was escorted by two mounted regiments - the 3d Ohio and 15th Pennsylvania, commanded by Colonel Zahm.

At Stewarts Creek, Zahm's convoy was compelled to wait at the side of the road, as Rousseau's train moved to the front. While waiting for the road to be cleared, the colonel was informed by Burke, that Wheeler's cavalry was operating in the immediate vicinity. After an hour's delay Zahm's convoy was again able to proceed. Lavergne was reached without

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mishap. Before pushing on to Nashville, Zahm decided it would be wise to permit his men and horses to take a break. While the men were resting in the fields adjoining the village, Zahm's scouts sighted a strong force of Rebels rapidly approaching from the southeast. After issuing orders for the trains to get under way, Zahm marshalled his command in line of battle.³

Upon gaining the vicinity of the Nashville pike, the greyclads sighted a wagon train. This convoy, escorted by detachments drawn from the 2d Tennessee Cavalry and 22d Indiana Infantry had left Stewarts Creek shortly after Zahm's departure. Wheeler quickly matured his plan of attack. The general with his own brigade and Buford's struck directly for the train, while Wharton's eager horsemen thundered toward Lavergne. Attacked by Wheeler's and Buford's men, with Wharton's between them and the village, the Tennessee Unionists fled. The infantry and teamsters were left to fend for themselves. Ninety-five disgusted members of the 22d Indiana immediately threw down their arms, and surrendered to Buford's command. After plundering the 30-odd wagons which they had captured the Rebels, advised of the presence of Zahm's convoy, started off after it.⁴

The presence of Colonel Innes' command - the 1st Regiment of Michigan Engineers and Mechanics at Lavergne probably saved Zahm's convoy. Innes having heeded Burke's warning, had completed his dispositions before the butternuts' put in their appearance. Discovering Innes' Michiganders holed up in a cedar brake, Wheeler decided to let Wharton deal with them, while he and Buford bagged the convoy.

Wharton upon reconnoitering the Union strongpoint realized that its

reduction would require artillery. Accordingly Wharton saw that a section of White's Tennessee Battery was emplaced, within 400 yards of the cedar brake in which Innes' regiment had holed up. After the cannoneers had hammered away at the Yankees for about an hour, Wharton decided to attack. Three units - the 14th Alabama Battalion, 1st Confederate, and 4th Tennessee-were massed to the Michiganders' front and flanks. The Rebels then hurled an exceeding vicious assault against Innes' stronghold. This thrust was easily repulsed. Three more attacks were launched against the engineers, but each in its turn was beaten off. In despair Wharton sent two staff officers forward, covered by flag of truce. The officers demanded, that Innes immediately surrender. This the hard-bitten colonel refused. Wharton next requested that the Confederates be allowed to collect and bury their dead. Innes likeness refused this request, stating that he would bury their dead and succor their wounded. Completely checkmated Wharton called off the attack and withdrew. In this engagement the Federals had lost 2 killed, 9 wounded, and 5 missing. Wharton while not reporting his casualties noted, my loss in the 14th Alabama Battalion, 1st Confederate, 4th Tennessee, and Murray's Regiment "in officers and men was very considerable".⁵

Having left Wharton's troopers to mop up, Wheeler's and Buford's men galloped off in pursuit of Zahm's convoy. The Confederate vanguard soon came up with Zahm's line of battle, deployed athwart the pike a short distance beyond Lavergne. While their skirmishers engaged the bluecoats, the remainder of the Rebel force moved forward in column of fours. Their

line of march paralleling the pike. Zahm sensing that the greyclads were seeking to separate him from the Wagon train, collected his command, and set off in grim pursuit. Fortunately for Zahm, he overtook the train, just as Wheeler's column drew abreast of it.

Checkmated in their efforts to interpose between the bluecoats and the train, the butternuts decided to shadow the convoy. After following the train for about two miles, Wheeler, in hopes that he might catch the Federals' napping, ordered his vanguard to attack. With a wild yell the greyclads came thundering up the pike. The Yankees had anticipated just such a move on the Confederates' part. Therefore, they were fully prepared to meet the charge. That is all but the troopers of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who broke, and scampered off in all directions. However, the men of the 3d Ohio held firm. The Rebel thrust was turned back. Urged on by their officers, the butternuts made a second dash toward the train. This was no more successful than the first. Furthermore this time the repulse was followed by a savage Union counterattack. In the course of which, the Federals reported that they had killed 9, wounded 11, and captured 2 of Wheeler's men. Stung by this set back, Wheeler decided it would be best to let the wagon train go in peace. Except for five wagons which broke down and were abandoned and burned Zahm's convoy, without further adventure, reached Nashville at 9 a.m.⁶

Evidently a number of the teamsters had panicked along with the men of the 15th Pennsylvania, when Wheeler's troopers had attacked Zahm's wagon train. For Colonel Parkhurst, whose convoy preceded Zahm's by several miles, was shocked and disturbed when his command was overhauled

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by these frightened people. The colonel halted his train and formed his regiment athwart the pike. Parkhurst learned from the fugitives that Zahm's train had been attacked near Lavergne. After stopping the stampede and calming the cavalymen, teamsters and Negroes, who had participated in the rout, Parkhurst pushed on to Nashville.⁷

Colonel Burke, upon being informed that Colonel Innes' regiment was under attack, ordered the detachment of the 4th Michigan Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Dickinson, and Newell's section of Ohio artillery, to the hard pressed Michiganders' support. Three-fourths of a mile southeast of Lavergne, Dickinson's troopers came upon the Confederates industriously engaged in plundering and burning the wagon train captured from the 2d Tennessee. Dismounting part of his command, and leaving them to protect the guns, the colonel moved to attack the greyclads with the remainder of his small force. After a brisk fire fight of about one-half hour's duration, the bluecoats forced the Rebels to retire.⁸

Meanwhile the sound of distant artillery fire from the direction of Lavergne, indicated to Burke that Innes was still holding out. Some two hours after Dickinson's departure, Mr. Reily (a civilian) reached Burke's headquarters with a message from Innes, requesting reinforcements. Burke determined to march to the Michiganders' aid, intrusting the security of the Stewarts Creek bridge to a regiment of casuals. The colonel set out at a rapid pace for Lavergne at the head of his command. While en-route to Innes' succor, the colonel encountered Dickinson's unit returning

to Stewarts Creek. After his men had driven the butternuts from the ruined wagons Dickinson, despairing of being able to cut his way through the Confederates to relieve Innes, had started to return to Stewarts Creek for reinforcements. Burke ordered his troopers to fall in behind his infantry. The column then pushed resolutely on toward Lavergne. Approaching the area where the train had been attacked Burke found the scene "indescribable":

Teamsters had abandoned their wagons and came back mounted on their mules and horses; wagons were packed across the road, and many capsized on the side of the pike; horses ran wild through the woods, and, although men were allowed by me to pass as wagon guards, there were none at their posts. They had left the road and were bivouacking in small parties in the woods, evidently careless of the fate of the trains.⁹

By the time that Burke's command had reached Lavergne, Innes engineers had repulsed Wharton's butternuts. The only Confederates encountered by Burke's men, were several small groups of stragglers lurking in the woods. These were easily flushed and put to flight by the bluecoated infantry.¹⁰

Having received orders to rejoin the army, the Confederate troopers, following the escape of Zahm's convoy and the failure to reduce Innes' stronghold, rendezvoused south of Lavergne. Once the unit commander had mustered their commands, the return march was taken up. By 2 a.m. the exhausted cavalymen had reached Overall Creek - Buford's brigade camping west of the stream, near Mrs. Washington's house. Wheeler's and Wharton's troopers, after crossing the stream, bivouacked in the fields adjacent to the Wilkinson pike. In addition to the material damage inflicted on the Union convoys, Wheeler was able to inform Bragg that the Army of the Tennessee was not retreating. But on the contrary the Federals were

digging in, and bringing up fresh supplies of food and ammunition.¹¹

On the 1st the few Confederate cavalry units which had been left behind upon the departure of Wheeler's powerful raiding force, patrolled the area between Cleburne's left flank and Overall Creek. The small number of troopers present insured a passive role. In spite of the fact that all the Union cavalry, except for the organizations detailed to guard the trains, was on the field, guarding the Army of the Cumberland's right flank, it likewise spent a quiet day. The vigorous scouting and patrolling carried on in this sector during the day, was left by the cavalry to the opposing infantry.

General Stanley had seen that his troopers were under arms at an early hour, two regiments being detailed for picket duty. About 9 a.m. it was called to the general's attention, that a strong Rebel skirmish line had emerged from the woods into the open fields south of Asbury pike. This was Liddell's brigade, sent out by Cleburne to make a forced reconnaissance toward the Nashville pike. Stanley noting that the infantry was supported by a battery (the Warren Light Artillery), ordered the troopers manning his line of outposts to withdraw. The difficult problem of coping with this forced reconnaissance, was delegated to the Union infantry. Throughout the remainder of the day as Federal and Rebel combat patrols slugged away at one another, the cavalry remained aloof from these savage little scraps.¹²

Shortly after daybreak on the 1st, Colonel Samuel Beatty, who was now in command of Van Cleve's division, sent his unit across Stones River

at McFadden's Ford. Encountering no opposition from the Confederates, Beatty's troops quickly carved out a bridgehead east of the river.¹³ Pegram's patrols covering the ford melted quickly away from Beatty's resolute advance. Once the bluecoats had halted and established their main line of resistance covering the ford, Pegram's troopers, made bolder by the presence of patrols drawn from Palmer's infantry brigade, pressed forward. The Yankees caught an occasional glimpse of these patrols, as they filtered through the woods to their immediate front. To deal with these greyclads, Beatty ordered the 3d Wisconsin Battery to cross the river. Placing their guns in position the artillerists opened fire on the Southerners. This type of persuasion served to disperse the butter-nuts. Whenever Pegram's troopers appeared to their front during the day, the Union brigade commanders would call for artillery support. Each time they did so the 3d Wisconsin Battery would go into action, sending the Rebel horsemen scurrying for cover. At nightfall Pegram's men retired. Shortly thereafter, Beatty ordered the 3d Wisconsin Battery to recross to the west side of Stones River.¹⁴

After listening to Wheeler's report of the previous day's raid on the Army of the Cumberland's supply lines, Bragg on the morning of the 2d, decided to grant the cavalymen a few hours in which to rest and feed their horses. Later in the day, Bragg issued instructions for Wharton to cross Stones River, and take position on the army's right flank. Upon Wharton's arrival, Pegram would report to the Texan for orders. Wheeler with his own and Buford's brigade would again move to the enemy's rear.

He would remain there until he could gain positive information as to whether or not, the Army of the Cumberland's brass contemplated a retrogrative movement.¹⁵

By late afternoon Wharton had established his headquarters near the Lebanon pike. In the meantime Bragg had decided that the Union bridgehead must be destroyed. Accordingly Breckinridge had massed four of his hard-hitting brigades, preparatory to moving against the bluecoats holding the bridgehead. Before launching his attack (which was scheduled for 4 p.m.) Breckinridge, feeling anxious about his right, sent two staff officers to acquaint Wharton with the situation. The officers soon returned to Breckinridge's headquarters, with the information that they had been unable to locate either Wharton or Pegram. Unable to delay any longer, while seeking to establish liaison with the cavalry Breckinridge ordered his men forward.¹⁶

Having received no intelligence of the projected attack, Breckinridge's onslaught took the cavalry officers completely by surprise. However, the combative Wharton quickly collected a small force with which to support the attacking infantry. Accompanied by three companies of the 8th Texas Cavalry and Huwald's Tennessee Battery, Wharton and Pegram hurried to the front. Wharton reached the front shortly after Breckinridge's greyclads had crushed Beatty's main line of resistance.

The eager Rebel infantry was in full pursuit of the bluecoats, who falling back in confusion toward the ford. Huwald's battery was hurriedly emplaced on a commanding hill, 500 yards east of the Hoover house.

Learning that Pegram had forbidden the cannoneers to open fire, for fear that they would hit their own men, Wharton took personal command of the battery. Opening fire on Grose's brigade, which had rallied near the Hoover house, the artillerists cut down a color bearer, and threw the brigade's line of battle into confusion.¹⁷ Wharton's horse was now shot from under him. By the time the general had procured another, the tide of battle had turned. Breckinridge's infantry had been caught in a terrible artillery barrage and cut to pieces. Capitalizing on the Confederates' stunned condition, the Yankees launched a massive counterattack. Fresh troops were poured across the river, to reinforce the two brigades holding out near the Hoover house.¹⁸

Endeavoring to rejoin the battery, Wharton found that it had fled. Hailing a staff officer, the general sent him flying to the rear with orders for Colonel Harrison, to hold the brigade ready to cover Breckinridge's retreat. Upon receipt of these instructions, Harrison dismounted and deployed the brigade in the edge of a woods, fronting the cornfield where the Federal line of battle had been posted before the attack. Wharton soon joined the brigade, and gave his stamp of approval to Harrison's dispositions. The cannoneers of White's battery were instructed to be ready to open fire on the on rushing bluecoats.

One of Breckinridge's brigadiers - General William Preston now put in an appearance, and advised Wharton to have the battery hold its fire, "as he might fire on some of our men". This Wharton did. Preston then succeeded in reforming the remnants of his brigade, along side Wharton's troopers. The dismounted cavalry and infantry, supported by Robertson's

battery, held their position in the verge of the woods, until ordered to retire by General Breckinridge. The men of Wharton's and Pegram's brigade, fearful that the Federals might seek to press their advantage, and reach the open country adjacent to the Lebanon pike, spent the night of the 2d in the saddle.¹⁹

Over on the Union right the opposing cavalymen took it easy during the daylight hours on the 2d. As on the previous day, Stanley saw that his subordinates kept their men under arms in the event of an emergency. Two regiments were thrown forward, with instructions to keep the Confederates under constant surveillance. This passive attitude was welcomed by Wheeler and Buford, because it would allow their troopers to partially recoupe their strength, preparatory to launching a new strike against Rosecrans' supply line. To deter the Federals from becoming too aggressive, the 51st Alabama was drawn up in line of battle near the Wilkinson pike. With the approach of darkness Stanley, after checking to see that his picket line was manned, allowed his men to bivouac.²⁰

As soon as it was dark enough to hide their movements from the foe, Wheeler and Buford mustered their commands. Last minute instructions were given and the long column moved quietly out. The Confederates followed the pike as far as Wilkinson's Cross-Roads. Here the buttermuts turned into a dirt road, which led in a northwesterly direction. Many miles had been covered, and the hour was late, before Wheeler decided to call a halt. The officers were told to let their dead-tired troopers get some sleep.

At daybreak the march was resumed. At Antioch Church, the raiders surprised and captured a Union foraging party. After a short break to allow the command to catch its second wind, Wheeler ordered the men to remount. Wheeler's next objective would be the Union convoys moving along the Nashville pike. The cavalry leader planned to strike the pike at Cox's Hill, seven miles southeast of Nashville.²¹

About the time that Wheeler's command was leaving Antioch Church, a convoy consisting of 95 wagons, loaded with hospital supplies and ammunition, had left Nashville for the front. This wagon train was strongly guarded by both infantry and cavalry. The infantry force consisting of eight companies 60th Illinois, two companies 10th Michigan, a battalion of the 52d Ohio, and the 6th Tennessee, was commanded by Colonel Daniel McCook. Colonel Zahm was in charge of the escorting cavalry, which was composed of detachments drawn from the 3d and 4th Ohio, and 2d Tennessee Cavalry.²²

Nothing exciting transpired to mar the march until about 2 p.m., when the head of the convoy reached Cox's Hill, near where the state insane asylum was located. Here the convoy was attacked by Wheeler's brigade. Buford's brigade being held in reserve.

McCook sighting the on rushing Rebel horsemen, ordered Colonel Silas C. Toler to take the 60th Illinois and the detachment of the 10th Michigan, and hold the wooded hill to the south of the pike. A staff officer was sent racing to the rear to urge the 6th Tennessee and 52d Ohio to hasten to the head of the convoy.

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Wheeler's rugged troopers quickly scattered a patrol of Union cavalrymen covering the convoy's right flank. About 60 of the butter-nuts reached the train. Leaping off their horses they started to cut loose the teams and upset wagons. McCook, unable to rally the patrol, singlehandedly engaged these greyclads - wounding at least one of them with his pistol. Before the Rebels were able to eliminate this hard-fighting member of the McCook family - Colonel Zahm, accompanied by some 20 men, came to his aid. The rugged colonel aided by the cavalrymen, succeeded in driving off the Confederate detachment. Meanwhile Colonel Toler's combat team had taken position on the commanding hill. Opening a destructive fire upon Wheeler's main column, Toler's infantry held it at bay.²³

Before the arrival of the staff officer ordering them to move to the front, the men of the 6th Tennessee and 52d Ohio, aided by those of the 2d Tennessee Cavalry, had repulsed a feeble attack on the convoy's rear. Learning that their assistance was needed, the infantrymen started for the head of the stalled convoy on the double. However, by the time that the panting infantrymen reached the point of danger, the Confederates had commenced to retire.

Frustrated in his initial effort to destroy the train by the combative McCook, Wheeler drew back, preparatory to launching another attack. Buford's brigade was dismounted, and deployed as skirmishers on Wheeler's left. But, before Wheeler was able to complete these dispositions, he learned from his scouts of the approach of the 6th Tennessee and 52d Ohio.

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Skillfully disengaging his command, Wheeler fell back to Antioch Church. The 6th Tennessee and 52d Ohio arrived just in time to fire a few harmless volleys, at the rapidly retreating Confederates. In this engagement the Federals had lost two men - one killed the other wounded. Wheeler made no report of his losses, but the bluecoats stated that they had killed 15, captured 14 and wounded 11 of the greyclads. Once the butternuts had departed, the convoy again started for the front, where it arrived at 1 a.m. on the 4th.²⁴

At Antioch Church, Wheeler was met by a messenger with orders for him to return to Murfreesboro immediately. On the 3d Bragg had decided to evacuate Murfreesboro. Reports from Wheeler indicating that the Federals instead of retiring, as he hoped, were rushing reinforcements to the front had greatly influenced Bragg's decision. The heavy rain which pelted down with little intermission throughout the day, had added to the urgency of the situation. For it presaged a rapid rise in Stones River, which would render the stream unfordable. Along roads which had been turned into oceans of mud, Wheeler's and Buford's troopers rode on the night of the 3d. By 4 a.m. (on the 4th) the cavalrymen reached their camps adjacent to Overall Creek. Here the Confederate cavalrymen learned that the Army of Tennessee had already retired across Stones River. However, Wheeler, taking cognizance of the exhausted condition of his command, decided to permit his men to get some rest before crossing the river.²⁵

Throughout the hours of daylight on the 3d the mounted troops

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(Stanley on the Union right and Wharton on the Confederate left), which had remained with the opposing armies in front of Murfreesboro did very little beyond manning a line of outposts, and sending out an occasional reconnaissance patrol.

If Bragg was to successfully disengage his army, under the cover of darkness, the cavalry would have to man the outposts held by the infantry. These posts would have to be held until daybreak on the 4th, if the Army of Tennessee was to steal a march on the foe. Before evacuating their positions Cheatham's outposts were relieved by the troopers of the 1st Tennessee Cavalry, Withers' by Wharton's cavalymen and Breckinridge's by Pegram's. Once the infantry and artillery had been pulled back from the front, Hardee and Polk marshalled their respective corps. The latter officer's line of retreat would be the Shelbyville pike, while the former would utilize the Manchester pike.²⁶

The Union brass, fearful that the rapidly rising water in Stones River would isolate their troops holding the bridgehead, withdrew this force on the night of the 3d. So intent was their concentration on this operation, that they failed to discover that the Army of Tennessee had fallen back, until after the Confederates had stolen a march upon them.

At daybreak the Rebel cavalry evacuated the line of outpost and fell back. Before leaving Murfreesboro, Wharton detached three of his regiments. Colonel Cox was placed in charge of this detached command, and directed to remain behind and observe the enemy's advance. Upon

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being forced to retire, Cox would see that the bridge which carried the Shelbyville pike across Stones River was destroyed. Pegram's brigade and the remainder of Wharton's then rode out of town - the former officer would cover the rear of Hardee's retreating corps, while the latter would screen Polk's.²⁷

Wheeler permitted his dog-tired cavalymen to get a few hours' rest, before he ordered the unit commanders to rouse them. About 9 a.m. the troopers crossed Stones River. Wheeler decided to remain, for the time being, in Murfreesboro with his own brigade and Cox's combat team. Buford's brigade was directed to join Wharton's command on the Shelbyville pike.²⁸

Union patrols cautiously feeling their way forward on the morning of the 4th, found the Confederate rifle pits evacuated. Word of the Army of Tennessee's retreat, was quickly communicated to Rosecrans' GHQ. Since the foe had evidently made good their escape, Rosecrans decided to collect and bury the dead, before moving forward and occupying Murfreesboro. It was late in the afternoon before this task was completed. Rosecrans then commenced to regroup his forces preparatory to crossing the river. Colonel Stanley's brigade, of Negley's division, was moved into position near the point where the railroad bridge that had formerly spanned Stones River had stood. Here the infantrymen were joined by the 1st Pioneer Battalion, whose task it would be to build a trestle bridge across the river. A brigade of Rousseau's division was held in close supporting distance of Stanley's. In the late afternoon Stanley's

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infantry engaged in some very light and harmless skirmishing with Wheeler's and Cox's troopers, ensconced on the opposite side of Stones River. During the day the Union cavalry officers concentrated their units at Wilkinson's Cross-Road, ready to move against the foe, upon a moment's notice.²⁹

At daybreak on the 5th General Thomas ordered Negley "to take command of the advance and pursue the enemy toward" Murfreesboro. Crossing the river at the ford, below the damaged railroad bridge Stanley's troops, encountering no opposition, quickly established a bridgehead on the east bank of Stones River.

Wheeler's and Cox's commands had fallen back the previous evening. Wheeler's brigade taking position three miles from town astride the Manchester pike, and Cox's, after destroying the Shelbyville pike bridge, moved to Christiana.

The bridgehead established, Negley detailed Colonel James F. Miller's brigade to assist the pioneers in throwing a bridge across Stones River. Two regiments of Brigadier General James G. Spear's brigade - the 1st and 6th Tennessee - were put to work repairing the railroad bridge. By 9 a.m. two bridges across Stones River were in operation, and Negley's division, reinforced by Walker's brigade, had occupied Murfreesboro. Here the infantry was joined by General Stanley's cavalry.³⁰

Learning from the civilians that the Confederates had retired from the area, via the Shelbyville and Manchester pikes, Stanley prepared to pursue. Colonel Zahm's brigade, supported by Colonel Stanley's infantry

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brigade, would follow the greyclads reportedly retreating toward Shelbyville, while General Stanley, accompanied by the remainder of the cavalry, would endeavor to overtake the ones seeking to escape via the Manchester pike.

In the course of its advance to a point some four and one-half miles south of Murfreesboro, Zahm's column bagged a number of Confederate stragglers. Here Zahm halted his command. A patrol drawn from the 4th Ohio was thrown forward in an effort to locate any organized Confederate force. The Buckeyes advanced another three miles to a commanding hill, from where a good view of the surrounding countryside could be obtained. Unable to spot any of the foe, the patrol rejoined Zahm. The column then returned to Murfreesboro, where it arrived at 7 p.m.³¹

Wheeler upon evacuating Murfreesboro had retired down the Manchester pike about three miles and camped. For security sake an advance picket line was established within a mile of Murfreesboro. As Stanley's troopers pushed forward his advance guard clashed with Wheeler's vedettes. Colonel Minty, who was in charge of the vanguard, informed Stanley of this development. The general immediately hastened to the front. Placing himself at the head of the 4th U. S. Cavalry, Stanley led a charge which scattered the greyclads, manning the outpost.

By this time Wheeler had alerted and deployed his troopers in a thick woods covering Lytle Creek. The Confederates held their fire until the Union vanguard had forded the stream, the bridge having previously been destroyed. Wiggins' cannoneers then commenced to hammer the Federals with shot and shell. However, the bluecoats failed to panic, and held their

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position. Minty quickly deployed his command - the 3d Kentucky to the right of the pike, the 7th Pennsylvania to the left. Three regiments - the 4th Michigan and 2d and 5th Tennessee were held in reserve.

Before giving Minty the word to order his men forward, Stanley sent a message to ask General Negley for infantry support. Negley ordered General Spear to support the cavalry, on the Manchester pike, with one regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. The 1st Tennessee and the gunners manning two guns of the 10th Wisconsin Battery, were the units designated by Spear to move to the cavalry's aid. However, shortly before the reinforcements put in their appearance, Stanley gave Minty the word - to attack! The 5th Tennessee and a battalion of the 4th Michigan were brought up from the reserve. These two units were massed adjacent to the pike, the Michiganders to the right of the Kentuckians, and the Tennesseans on the Pennsylvanians' left. In this formation the blue-coats moved forward, forcing Wheeler's greyclads to retire before them. The heavy growth of cedars and dense underbrush, caused the Yankees more trouble than the foe.³²

Skillfully disengaging his brigade, Wheeler retired to a better defensive position, athwart the Manchester pike about five miles from Murfreesboro. Here Wheeler was reinforced by Pegram's brigade. Upon approaching Wheeler's new main line of resistance, Stanley impressed by its strength, decided to postpone his attack pending the infantry's and artillery's appearance. When these reinforcements arrived on the scene Stanley prepared to assault. To soften up the Confederates' position, and neutralize the fire of Wiggins' cannon, the section of Wisconsin

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artillery was emplaced near the pike. The Tennessee infantrymen were formed in support of the guns, their flanks protected by the 7th Pennsylvania and 4th U. S. Cavalry.

After a vigorous contest of about one hour's duration, the Confederates evacuated their position, taking up a new one a mile further to the rear. The Federals satisfied with their success, and taking into account the late hour, returned to Murfreesboro. While enroute to Murfreesboro the bluecoats encountered Spear, accompanied by the remainder of his brigade, hastening to their support. Learning from Stanley that Wheeler's retreat made this unnecessary, Spear's command retraced its steps. With these clashes on the Manchester pike on January 5, the bloody Stones River Campaign drew to a close.³³

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Notes

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - BATTLE OF STONES RIVER

Chapter III

CAVALRY OPERATIONS - JANUARY 1-5

- 1 Ibid., 667.
- 2 Ibid., 654-655. Several units, among them the 3d Alabama Cavalry, were left behind for picket duty upon the cavalry's departure. One of Wharton's regiments - the 2d Tennessee - was detached on the morning of the 1st, and ordered to report to General Pegram.
- 3 Ibid., 634, 653.
- 4 Ibid., 630, 959-960, 968, 971.
- 5 Ibid., 651, 968-969.
- 6 Ibid., 634, 637, 642.
- 7 Ibid., 653.
- 8 Ibid., 628-629, 655.
- 9 Ibid., 655-656.
- 10 Ibid., 656.
- 11 Ibid., 959, 960, 969, 971.
- 12 Ibid., 618, 625.
- 13 Ibid., 575. Van Cleve had been wounded on the 31st, and during the evening the general had turned over his command to Colonel Peatty.
- 14 Ibid., 575, 582, 598, 608. During the afternoon of the 1st, Grose's brigade had reinforced the bridgehead, but at dark the unit recrossed the river.

- 15 Ibid., 667.
- 16 Ibid., 785-786, 969.
- 17 Ibid., 969. Grose's brigade had crossed the river for a second time on the morning of the 2d.
- 18 Ibid., Grose's brigade and Colonel James P. Fyffe's brigade, of Beatty's division, were the two units holding out near the Hoover house.
- 19 Ibid., 813, 969.
- 20 Ibid., 618, 625, 964, 971.
- 21 Ibid., 959-960, 964, 971.
- 22 Ibid., 445, 638, 642.
- 23 Ibid., 445, 638, 959-960, 964, 971.
- 24 Ibid., 420, 425, 638, 959-960, 964, 971.
- 25 Ibid., 669, 959-960, 964, 971.
- 26 Ibid., 618, 625, 969; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 479.
- 27 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 265, 969; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 482-483.
- 28 Q. R., Series, I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 959-960, 964, 971.
- 29 Ibid., 169, 374, 408, 618, 625, 959-960.
- 30 Ibid., 374, 408, 418, 959-960; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 485. Spears' brigade which had joined the army of the morning of the 3d, was assigned to Negley's division that evening.
- 31 Q. R., Series, I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 408, 618, 638.
- 32 Ibid., 418, 618, 625, 957-959.
- 33 Ibid., 409, 418, 618, 625, 957-959.

APPENDIX I

ORDER OF BATTLE

Union Cavalry Engaged in the Stones River Campaign (Dec. 26,

1862-Jan. 5, 1863). Chief of Cavalry - Brigadier

General David S. Stanley

Cavalry Division - Colonel John Kennett

	<u>K</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>M</u>
1st Brigade - Colonel Robert H. G. Minty			
Company M, 2d Indiana Cavalry-Capt. Jas. Mitchell	1		14
3d Kentucky Cavalry-Col. E. H. Murray	1	8	1
4th Michigan Cavalry-Lt. Col. W.H. Dickinson	1	7	12
7th Pennsylvania Cavalry-Maj. J. E. Wynkoop	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>50</u>
	5	24	77
2d Brigade - Colonel Lewis Zahm			
Col. M. Milliken (K)			
1st Ohio Cavalry - Maj. J. Laughlin	5	11	15
3d Ohio Cavalry - Lt. Col. D. A. Murray	6	15	13
4th Ohio Cavalry - Maj. J. L. Pugh	<u>7</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>31</u>
	18	44	59
Artillery			
Section Battery D, 1st Ohio Light Artillery			
(two 10-pounder Rodmans)-Lt. N. M. Newell	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
	1	0	0

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	<u>K</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>M</u>
*Reserve Cavalry			
Maj. A.G. Rosengarten (K)			
Maj. F. B. Ward (K)			
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry-Capt. A. Vezin	9	9	53
2d Tennessee Cavalry - Col. D. M. Ray	3	10	5
5th Tennessee Cavalry - Col. W. B. Stokes	—	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>
	12	25	67
Unattached			
4th U. S. Cavalry - Capt. E. Otis	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>
Total casualties cavalry	39	103	215

* Under the immediate command of General Stanley.

According to the December returns Stanley's total strength during the Stones River campaign was: 215 officers and 4210 enlisted men.

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ORDER OF BATTLE

Confederate Cavalry Engaged in the Stones River Campaign

(Dec. 26, 1862 - Jan. 5, 1863)

Chief of Cavalry - Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler

K W M

Wheeler's Brigade - Brigadier General Wheeler.

1st Alabama Cavalry - Col. W. W. Allen

Maj. F. Y. Gaines

3d Alabama Cavalry - Capt. T. H. Mauldin

Col. J. T. Morgan

51st Alabama Cavalry - Lt. Col. J. D. Webb (W)

8th Confederate Cavalry - Col. W. B. Wade

Douglass' Tennessee Cavalry Battalion-Maj. D. C. Douglass

Holman's Tennessee Cavalry Battalion-Maj. D. W. Holman

Wiggins' Arkansas Battery (4-guns)

Capt. J. H. Wiggins

— — —
22 61 84

Wharton's Brigade - Brigadier General John A. Wharton

14th Alabama Cavalry Battalion-Lt. Col. J. C. Malone

1st Confederate Cavalry - Col. J. T. Cox

3d Confederate Cavalry-Lt. Col. W. N. Estes

Lt. Col. J. E. Dunlop

2d Georgia Cavalry - Maj. F. M. Ison

Detachment 3d Georgia Cavalry -Maj. R. Thompson

** 2d Tennessee Cavalry - Col. H. M. Ashby

4th Tennessee Cavalry - Col. B. Smith

Murray's Tennessee Cavalry - Maj. W. S. Bledsoe

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K W M

Davis' Tennessee Cavalry Battalion-
Maj. J. R. Davis

12th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion -
Capt. L. T. Hardy

White's Tennessee Battery (4 guns) -
Capt. B. F. White (Taken ill)
Lt. A. Pue

— — —
20 131 113

Buford's Brigade - Brigadier General Abraham Buford

2d Kentucky Cavalry - Col. J. R. Butler

5th Kentucky Cavalry - Col. D. H. Smith

6th Kentucky Cavalry - Col. J. W. Grigsby

**Section Bufala Battery (2 guns) Lt. W. J. McKenzie

— — —
3 10 23

Pegram's Brigade- Brigadier General John Pegram

1st. Georgia Cavalry - Col. J. J. Morrison

1st Louisiana Cavalry - Col. J. C. Scott

1st Tennessee Cavalry - Col. J. E. Carter

16th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion-Lt. Col. J. R. Neal

Huwald's Tennessee Battery (4 guns) Capt. G. A. Huwald

** Transferred to Pegram's brigade Jan. 1.

***Attached to Buford's brigade Dec. 29.

No Returns

Strength of Confederate Cavalry during the Stones River Campaign.

Present for Duty

	Officers	Men	Aggregate
Wheeler's Brigade	124	1,045	1,169

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	Officers	Men	Aggregate
Wharton's Brigade	158	1,792	1,950
Pegram's Brigade	30	450	480
Buford's Brigade	<u>52</u>	<u>586</u>	<u>638</u>
Total	364	3,873	4,237

APPENDIX II

Statement of public animals and means of transportation, captured by the Confederates, killed in battle, and lost and destroyed in the period from December 26, 1862, until January 16, 1863, by the Army of the Cumberland.

COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESS, SETS	<u>HORSES</u>			TOTAL	MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY			
Right Wing	10	1	60					60	60
Headquarters									
Davis's Division									
Headquarters			3	7		1	8	5	11
Ammunition and Supply train	35		204	4		3	7	204	211
Post's Brigade									
Headquarters			4	3		1	4		4
22d Indiana	1		6			2	2	5	7
59th Illinois	2	1	12			2	2	11	13
74th Illinois	2		12					12	12
75th Illinois	1		6					12	12
5th Wisconsin Battery	2		30		21		21	12	33
Carlin's Brigade			24						
Headquarters			13				1	24	25
21st Illinois	4		14	1				13	13

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COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESS, SETS	HORSES			MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY		
38th Illinois	2		28	3		1	15	16
15th Wisconsin	2	1	2			3	25	28
101st Ohio	4							
2d Minnesota Battery					13	13		13
Woodruff's Brigade								
Headquarters						4	4	1 5
25th Illinois	1		6			1	1	6 7
35th Illinois	1		6			4	4	6 10
81st Indiana	2		10	4		1	5	6 11
8th Wisconsin Battery			8		18		18	18
Company								
15th Illinois Cavalry						3	3	3
Company G,								
2d Kentucky Cavalry						7	7	7
Johnson's Division								
3d Indiana Cavalry		1				30	30	30
Supply train	3		18				18	18
Ammunition train	2		12				12	12
Willich's Brigade								
15th Ohio		1	5	4		4	1	5

COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESS, SETS	HORSES			TOTAL	MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY			
49th Ohio		1	4						
32d Indiana		1		1			1	1	2
39th Indiana	1	1	4	4			4		4
89th Illinois		2	2	2			2		2
Battery A, 1st Ohio Light Art- illery		1	30		62		62		62
Kirk's Brigade									
Headquarters						7	7	7	14
34th Illinois				1			1		1
79th Illinois	1			2			2	1	3
29th Indiana	1	1	2	2			2	4	6
30th Indiana			1					2	2
77th Pennsylvania				2			2		2
Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery			82	7	75		82	6	88
Baldwin's Brigade									
Headquarters	1		6					6	6
93d Ohio		1	4	5			5		5
5th Kentucky	1		6	1			1	6	7
6th Indiana		1	6	1			1	6	7
5th Indiana Battery			13		24		24		24

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COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESS SETS	HORSES			TOTAL	MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY			
74th Ohio	1	1	6	2			2	4	6
37th Indiana	4	1	16	1			1	12	13
21st Ohio	4	1	1	6			6		6
78th Pennsylvania	1		14	1		9	10		10
Bat. G, 1st Ohio Arty.			28		46		46		46
Bat. M, 1st Ohio Arty			1		9		9	1	10
Bat. B. Kentucky Arty	1		19		18		18		18
Left Wing									
Wood's Division									
Supply train								2	2
6th Ohio Battery			2		16		16		16
10th Indiana Battery					22		22	1	23
8th Indiana Battery	2		12		18	3	21	12	33
26th Ohio	1	1	8	4			4	6	10
58th Indiana	2		12					12	12
3d Kentucky	1		6					6	6
13th Michigan			6					6	6
Palmer's Division									
Supply train	2		6					12	12
90th Ohio	1								
110th Illinois								1	1

COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESS SETS	HORSES			TOTAL	MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY			
51st Illinois	2	1	14	18			18	18	36
Battery C, 1st Illinois Artillery	1		8		85		85	8	93
Center									
Rousseau's Division									
3d Ohio	1							4	4
88th Indiana	1		4	1			1		1
1st Michigan Battery				10			10		10
Shepherd's Brigade									
Headquarters				1			1		1
1st Bat. 18th U.S.			2					10	10
2d Bat. 18th U. S.		1	2					2	2
Bat. H. 5th U. S. Arty.					15		15		15
Negley's Division									
Headquarters and division train	5		90					90	90
Stanley's Brigade									
Headquarters				1			1		1
18th Ohio				6			6	4	10
Miller's Brigade									
Headquarters	2		12	1		1	2	8	10

COMMAND

	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESSES	HORSES			MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY		
Sheridan's Division								
Headquarters ammunition and supply train	58		348				348	348
Sill's Brigade								
36th Illinois	1		6				6	6
88th Illinois	2	1	14	2		2	12	14
44th Wisconsin	1		6				1	1
44th Wisconsin Battery	1	1		2	43	45	6	51
Schaffer's Brigade								
Headquarters	1		6				6	6
2d Missouri	1		4				4	4
15th Missouri								
44th Illinois								
73d Illinois	1		6				6	6
Battery G, 1st Missouri Artillery	1		6		37	37	6	43
Robert's Brigade								
Headquarters	1		6				6	6
22d Illinois	1		6				6	6
42d Illinois	2	2	16				16	16
42d Illinois	1	2	8				8	8

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COMMAND	WAGONS	AMBULANCES	HARNESSETS	HORSES			TOTAL	MULES	ANIMALS
				DRAUGHT	ARTILLERY	CAVALRY			
9th Indiana		1	1	2			2		2
Van Cleve's Division									
Supply train	2		8					7	7
3d Wisconsin Battery					11		11		11
26th Pennsylvania Battery					7		7		7
7th Indiana Battery					5		5		5
Detached									
Michigan Engineers and Mechanics	3		41	21			21	20	41
3d Ohio Cavalry	1		6					6	6
Capt. Warren's Supply train	6								
Total	229	28	1540	139	555	80	774	1334	2108